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[ African Standby Force ]

Africa’s budding peace architecture

The continent has not yet met the ambitious goals it set itself four years ago. The African Standby Force (ASF) is not yet able to intervene in crisis situations and prevent genocide or crimes against humanity. Whereas military mindsets have often been an obstacle to development at the national and bilateral level, there is real hope for armed forces to play a more constructive role under multilateral command. In the case of the African Union, progress may be uneven so far, but it certainly is encouraging.


[ By Jakkie Cilliers ]

According to recent data, the number of open armed conflicts is going down in Africa, whereas peacekeeping efforts are becoming common. These trends have been most prominently highlighted by the Human Security Report (HSR), which is published by the Human Security Centre based at the University of British Columbia, Canada.

In 2005, the first HSR found that the overwhelming majority of today’s armed conflicts are fought within, and not between, states and that most take place in the poorest parts of the world, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. In 2007, the HSR stated that, from 1999 to the end of 2006, the number of state-based armed conflicts in Africa declined by almost half. Conflicts fought between various armed groups but not involving
governments even declined by 54 %. By 2006, the annual battle-death toll from all types of conflict had dropped by almost two thirds from 2002 to 2006.

To explain these remarkable trends, the authors advance two arguments.
– There has been a sharp reduction in the number of autocratic and semi-autocratic governments on the African continent, and it is assumed that democracies contribute to more domestic and regional security.
– There is more external peacekeeping engagement, particularly through the African Union and United Nations, along with mediation and engagement by these and other third parties.

International activism is clearly paying off. By mid-2008, the United Nations had 48,043 troops, 1,941 mili­tary observers and 6,520 police in the six key missions in Africa alone. It is noteworthy that the annual UN budget for peace missions all over the world is of only
$ 7.1 billion – less than what the USA spends per month in Iraq.
African leadership

African engagement has served as a catalyst for international support and the return of UN peacekeepers to Africa after the tragedies of Somalia and Rwanda in the early 1990s. Today, Africa is the continent with the largest UN commitment on peacekeeping with eight of the seventeen active UN peace missions in Africa. While the United States, Japan and European countries like Germany largely tend to fund these missions, all missions include a significant contribution of African troops and police. Moreover, African diplomats are now heavily engaged in making and keeping the peace on their continent.

Typically, the initiative is that of the African Union, often in partnership with the international community. In this sense, the AU, which was founded in 2002 with the goal of securing peace, has already proven its worth. One example of Africa’s modern approach is how Tanzania, Sudan and Libya cooperated in March in support of the Comores’ armed forces to remove self-styled “President” Mohammed Bacar from power on the island of Anjouan. In this case, there had been little progress in spite of several months of sanctions and mediation. In the end, Ahmed Abdallah Sambi, the president of the Union of Comoros, called for active intervention.

To African eyes, other success stories are about Burundi, Darfur, Somalia and Zimbabwe. These may not be successes in the sense of crises having been resolved. But it is noteworthy that Africans are playing leading roles in addressing rather intractable conflicts in these places, and that the international community has accepted such African leadership. Undeniably, there is scope to further improve the performance of the AU (see box below). But beyond any doubt, it is already contributing to making and keeping peace.


New paradigm of non-indifference

Indeed, pan-African political engagement has risen to a new level. In 2005 and 2006, the AU’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) met 24 times. In 2007, it met more than 30 times. According to its protocol, the PSC is “a standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts”.

A recent audit report summarised its role as follows: “The PSC is expected to coordinate and harmonise continental efforts in the prevention and combating of terrorism in all its aspects. It is also entrusted with the responsibility of developing a common defence policy.”

What matters even more is that the AU has substituted the strict principle of non-interference with one of non-indifference. That also became evident in reconciliation efforts after election-related violence in Kenya and Zimbabwe this year. Indeed, Africa began to implement the UN’s responsibility to protect (R2P) agenda even before the respective principles were adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2005. Tentative at first, AU engagement is becoming increasingly robust. The military deployment in Anjouan is only the most recent example.

Many challenges remain, of course. It would be naïve to assume that the AU can engage substantively on its own to stop violence in places like Darfur, Somalia or along the Ethiopian-Eritrean border. Despite its rhetoric, the AU remains a club of leaders rather than an assembly of its people. And although the number of democrats has increased steadily, key leaders still lack a democratic mandate. Leaders of some countries have not been elected at all (consider Libya, for instance), or have come to power in rather dubious electoral circumstances (Zimbabwe, Nigeria or Kenya are examples). Moreover, the actual leverage that countries have over one another is constrained by the state of African armed forces, lack of control of border, countries’ often limited territorial control of their own territory, domestic challenges and the like.


Moving ahead

Though the environment is obviously difficult, progress is being made. Early in this decade, the EU established the Africa Peace Facility. It became an important catalyst, providing the AU with almost € 300 million for peacekeeping and related capacity building from 2003 to 2006. The instrument became operational with a grant to the first AMIS (African Union Mission in Sudan) operation in July 2004. Support from other partners followed, including the UN. Today, the UN Security Council spends more time discussing Africa than any other region.

The AU is making progress on several components of its peace and security system. One example is the Panel of the Wise. The members of this five-person panel (one from each of Africa’s five subregions) were appointed in January 2007, procedures for working are in place. Rather than engage in the hot conflicts that make headlines, this Panel is meant to focus on the forgotten and unresolved crises as well as the implementation of peace agreements. One should not underestimate this institution’s potential role and behind-the-scenes relevance, though it may not look spectacular at first glance.

Progress is also evident with the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS). Its task is to provide the chair of the AU Commission with timely information, so that he or she can advise the PSC on “potential conflicts and threats to peace and security” and recommend “best courses of action”. Substantial work on indicators, systems and processes has been concluded. The CEWS is already providing various services, and should be fully operational by 2010.


Getting ready to intervene

So far, most attention and money was spent on the African Standby Force (ASF). The idea is to provide the AU with capabilities to respond to conflicts by deploying peacekeeping forces and intervening in cases of crises to prevent atrocities such as genocide and crimes against humanity. This is spelled out in article 4 of the African Union’s Constitutive Act. Originally, the idea behind the ASF was “never to allow another genocide like Rwanda”.

The ASF will be designed for rapid deployment. It is to become capable of a multiplicity of peace support operations, ranging from preventive deployment, peacekeeping, peace building, post-conflict disarmament, demobilisation, re-integration and humanitarian assistance.

In a reversal of common international thought, it has now become accepted that the African Union can and should deploy in advance of the UN, as happened with AMIS in Darfur and subsequently with the AU Mission to Somalia. All too often, the UN is unable to act fast. Therefore the AU had to act in the case of Burundi. In a similar way, ECOWAS (the Economic Community of West African States) intervened in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Cote d’Ivoire (also note interview with General Francis Agyemfra, p. 390).

Today, it is accepted that the ASF is to act first, with the option of UN multi-dimensional peace support operations following suit. The exit strategy for the ASF is thus a transition to the UN, and that could include the re-designation of ASF resources as UN contingents. However, it must be ensured that such reassignment will not unduly deplete the capacities of the ASF. The ASF will only have around 25,000 troops – half of the number of UN peacekeepers deployed in Africa today.

Strategically, the lack of predictable, adequate financial resources to meet the demands of peacekeeping in Africa remains the most obvious hurdle. A lack of capacity and hence for guidance at the level of the AU Commission has also complicated progress; regions have applied their own interpretation to the common roadmap that set out the way forward on the ASF.

Today, key arrangements in regions such as SADC, ECOWAS and in Eastern Africa regarding command and control, logistics and planning differ from one another. Obviously, this setting complicates the deployment and use of forces from different regions.


Reasons for hope

In reviewing the progress with the ASF, Africa has admittedly not met the ambitious goals it set itself four years ago. Progress has been uneven, but it is certainly impressive. We must not fool ourselves, however: more needs to be done if Africa is ever to enjoy any reliable peace architecture of its own.

The matter of what needs to be done to move from instability and insecurity to development and peace is deceptively simple. Certainly, Africa and its friends need to prevent conflicts from occurring, manage those that do break out and, once stability has been restored, prevent a return to conflict. Most important of all, African leadership should set the basis for sustainable peace – a condition only possible in the long run if based on solid economic growth.

In this vein, it is important to recognise that, in 2006 and 2007, more than 30 African countries grew at rates of four percent and more. According to Donald Kaberuka, the president of the African Development Bank, “Africa is exhibiting a changed economic landscape that gives us a great sense of optimism for the future”. The crisis regions that have shaped the continent’s reputation are not typical of Africa.

Indeed, the majority of African countries have recently enjoyed rising levels of prosperity, stability, and the normalisation of fragile-state situations. Unless recent spikes in food and fuel prices undermine these trends in the long run, further progress in terms of peace, stability and better governance in general looks probable too.

AU reform needs

Last year, Ghanaian president John Koufor, then chairperson of the African Union (AU), commissioned an organisational audit. This audit was, in fact, a comprehensive assessment of all AU structures – a no-holds barred organisational review that spoke candidly about the manifold problems that beset this multilateral, continent-spanning body. The audit touched on all structures of the African Union, including
– the Assembly of Heads of State and Government that meets twice a year,
– the Executive Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs,
– the Permanent Representatives Committee that oversees the work of the AU Commission in Addis
Abeba, the organisation’s executive branch,
– the Pan-African Parliament in South Africa,
– various specialized technical committees and
– the Peace and Security Council.

Like most enquiries of this nature the origin of the audit is deeply political. Southern African states wanted to counter the grandiose ambitions of Alpha Konare, the former Chairperson of the African Union Commission towards rapid African integration. Members of SADC (Southern African Development Community) have a more pragmatic and ultimately realistic belief that integration should commence at sub-regional level and translate into substantive steps at the continental level.

The AU lacks an effective sanctions regime for dealing with recalcitrant states and leaders; and the will to engage with fellow leaders, many of who share a common democratic deficit, is limited. A collection of the world’s poorest, and therefore most violent, countries, African politics often takes the form of the lowest common denominator – driven by consensus and accommodation. In this light, it is quite commendable that the AU is playing a constructive and useful role nonetheless.
The chairperson of the audit committee, Adebayo Adedeji, a Nigerian Professor, summarised the challenges: “Although the Commission, as the nerve centre of the African Union architecture, has lifted the profile of the Union globally, it is handicapped at three levels. First, there is a lack of clarity in the set up of its leadership. Second, its activities are spread too widely for it to be effective in playing the role envisaged for it; and thirdly, the management needs to be improved.”

Evidence of the challenges lies in the fact that the Commission so far has an approved staffing structure of 912 positions – of which only 60 % have been filled. The reason is not lack of funds. The total contributions of members to the AU budget has tripled in recent years to around $ 100 million per annum, an amount roughly matched by donors who fund various components of the African peace and security architecture. While most money has been spent on building the African Standby Force (ASF), other systems such as the Continental Early Warning Mechanism have also benefited handsomely.

Indeed, the African Union cannot absorb the donor funds available to it, which possibly explains why it does not effectively ensure that African member states contribute their annual fees timely and in full. The low absorption capacity of the African Union is compounded by its own administrative shortcomings and the accountability bottlenecks between the African Union and its partners.

The Audit report concluded with 159 substantive recommendations. The ones relating to the Peace and Security Council were all accepted by the Executive Council. They ranged from a general recommendation to continue to streamline its working methods, to specific recommendations including adopting the Arria type of meetings to enable the PSC to interact informally with civil-society organisations. (jc)

D+C, 2008/10, Focus, Page 374-377