G20
SDGs on the agenda of Hamburg summit in 2017

Criminal justice
Balanced debate must follow African criticism of ICC

European Union
The EPA policy urgently needs reconsideration

International cooperation
Focus: International cooperation

Tackling climate change

The Paris Agreement is a step in the right direction, write Leena Srivastava and Arun Kansal of TERI University in Delhi, but countries will have to scale up their pledges to achieve its goals. Thomas Loster of Munich Re Foundation assesses the results of the recent climate summit in Marrakesh. Dirk Messner of Germany’s Advisory Council on Global Change discusses the advances made in climate protection in recent years and reflects on such experience in the context of institution building in history. Page 12, 15, 16

The SDGs on the G20 agenda

The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are the UN’s agenda to follow up on the Millennium Development Goals. The G20, the informal forum of the leaders of the world’s largest economies, has pledged to support this agenda. Kathrin Berensmann of the German Development Institute (DIE) assesses what the G20 is doing in this context. Page 21

African discontent with ICC

The International Criminal Court (ICC) has recently been criticised by African leaders. The governments of three countries have announced they will cancel ICC membership. Though Darleen Seda of the International Nuremberg Principles Academy sees some merit in the criticism, she warns that it would be irresponsible to leave the court. Page 25

Getting to know one another

Germany’s Federal Government and the African Union launched a new exchange programme called the African-German Youth Initiative this year. Martial De-Paul Ikounga is the AU commissioner for human resources, science and technology. He told D+C/E+Z why youth exchange matters. Page 34

In the balance

The Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the EU and three of Africa’s Regional Economic Communities are facing challenges. A new strategic initiative is urgently needed, demands Helmut Asche of Mainz University. Page 36

Better medical services

The East African Community (EAC) is working on improving health systems. With support from a wide range of partners, including Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, it has set up a centre of excellence to enhance expertise in health management. Alan Brooks of Gavi reports. Page 40

Editorial

We need cooperation, not walls

That Donald Trump will become US president is very bad news. The domestic impact will be awful, and the international impact will probably be worse. There is no need to reiterate the list of Trump’s flaws. His shortcomings are well known. A brief summary includes racism, sexism and authoritarianism as well as disrespect for the truth, science and the conventions of democracy. His business deals are shady, and he is the first president in decades to not have revealed what he has paid in taxes.

In terms of domestic US affairs, two predictions are safe:
- Trump will get to appoint at least one Supreme Court judge and probably more, and a conservative Supreme Court will have a bearing on US policymaking far beyond Trump’s time in office.
- Trump will not be able to fulfil all expectations he has raised by promising to “make America great again”, so his administration is likely to hound its opponents, stating that they are blocking the way to greatness.

Both predictions mean that civil liberties will be under attack. As a consequence, pro-democracy rhetoric will sound less convincing internationally. Other international impacts will be painful too. US presidents are hardly constrained by checks and balances in foreign affairs. Their global influence is great. George W. Bush showed the world that a US president can do a lot of irreparable damage.

What Trump has said about foreign affairs so far does not add up to any coherent philosophy. He has indicated that he does not like US troops getting involved in foreign countries, but has also promised to crush ISIS by military means. He is unpredictable, does not feel bound by his own words and pretends to fight “the establishment”. There is reason to doubt he will accept the established norms of international affairs.

One thing is clear, however. Trump’s stance is isolationist. He promises to take care of his country’s interests and seems ready to renegotiate any deal at any time if that looks advantageous. He views the world as a kind of jungle in which every national government can and should do whatever it deems best for its country with no regard for the global common good. Those who campaigned for Britain to leave the EU this summer share that view, and these Brexiteers are now making it close to impossible for Prime Minister Theresa May to come up with a convincing foreign policy. The more governments focus narrowly on narrow national interests, the harder it becomes to achieve the kind of global governance humankind needs.

Trump’s stance on climate change is an example. He wants to quit the Paris Agreement, and non-cooperation by the USA will surely slow down joint action at the global level. On the upside, renewable-energy technology is becoming ever more attractive in economic terms, so there is a business case for protecting the climate. However, humankind has no time to lose in protecting the climate, and President Trump means a loss of time.

My slim hope is that the international community might unite against him. It is not likely, but possible, to judge by the recent climate summit in Marrakesh. Unfortunately, Trump is not the first populist to rise to power. They all claim to put their nation first, show little concern for the common good and project strongman images. They are not serving their nations well, but undermining the global public goods we all depend on. We don’t need walls; we need cooperation on things like peace, trade and many others.
Focus: International cooperation

Leena Srivastava and Arun Kansal

Only global cooperation can bring about climate protection

Thomas Loster

Marrakesh climate summit delivered important results

Dirk Messner interviewed by Hans Dembowski

Disasters loom unless governments work together

D+C/E+Z

Insurances to manage climate risks

Kathrin Berensmann

G20 support for UN 2030 Agenda and SDGs

Christian R. Pooño

Paradigm change at International Monetary Fund?

Darleen Seda

African criticism of International Criminal Court must be taken seriously

Eckhard Deutscher and Erich Stather

Unless Europe unites, it will not shape global change

D+C/E+Z

Think tank wants ODA-recipients to take donors at word

Hans Dembowski

Global policymaking requires global media debate

Martial De-Paul Ikounga interviewed by Eva-Maria Verfürth

How international youth exchange can change the world

Helmut Asche

EU-Africa relations need restart

Alan Brooks

East African countries cooperate on improving health-care management

Moses Chakanga, Flora Müller and Klemens Riha

When nature parks transcend national borders

Debate

Comments on hate crimes in Germany, the EU-Turkish relationship and the power struggle in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Fighting for space

Around the globe, people are losing their livelihoods because of land grabbing. Indigenous peoples are affected in particular. Oxfam demands more transparency concerning land ownership. Journalist Lea Diehl reports. Page 4

Slipping apart

Turkey is increasingly keeping a distance towards the European Union, so the EU must reconsider the relationship. Nassir Djafari, a free-lance consultant, warned at the end of November that the refugee deal is likely to fail. Page 47

Take on hate crime

Germany’s Federal Government should heed the advice spelled out in a recent report on hate crimes. It was wise to assign the study, and showing unwavering support for human rights means to set the right example within the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, writes Hugh Williamson of Human Rights Watch. Page 46
Land ownership

Fighting for livelihoods

Around the globe, people are losing their livelihoods because of land grabbing. Indigenous peoples are affected in particular. Oxfam demands more transparency concerning land ownership.

Investors have demand for millions of hectares around the world because they want to produce palm oil or fuels. They tend to neglect the rights and interests of the people who live on the land they want. Millions of people are losing their livelihoods. Smallholder farmers, herders and fishers are affected. Indigenous communities suffer in particular – not only in developing countries, but also in Australia, New Zealand or the USA.

Land grabs particularly hurt those people who depend on land most desperately and are actually good guardians of the soil, argue the authors of a recent Oxfam report, which is called “Custodians of the land, defenders of our future”. The document discusses environmental destruction due to the cutting of trees, the killing of wildlife and the depletion of fisheries.

Oxfam is running campaigns to protect indigenous lands. One is called “Land rights now”. The goal is to get half of all indigenous lands registered as such by 2020.

All too often, land ownership of indigenous and local communities is not formally registered. Investors take advantage of this omission by declaring the land to be unused. The Oxfam authors write that many indigenous people are not familiar with the institutions that regulate capitalist markets.

The growth of industries – including agriculture – and infrastructure worsens the poverty of indigenous people, according to the International Work Group of Indigenous Affairs (IWGA). Governments are accused of attracting industries without paying attention to the rights of local communities and even changing laws in ways that serve corporate interests.

Tourism is a problem too, Oxfam argues, and negotiations between governments and tourism operators tend to be non-transparent. In many cases, more tourism means more land grabs. After Sri Lanka’s civil war, for example, the country’s armed forces set up electric fences in a place called Panama in 2010 in order to keep villagers away from their traditional lands. Today, the people no longer have fields to cultivate, because hotels and conference facilities have been built there.

Land grabs mean that the traditional owners are deprived of livelihoods and natural resources. Moreover, the cultural identity and the self-esteem of rural communities depend on land. In some cases, according to Oxfam, land grabbing therefore equals ethnocide. Scholars’ studies concerning Inuit in Alaska and Aborigines in Australia support this view. Indigenous people are put at disadvantage in other ways too, moreover. For example, many employers do not hire them.

Civil-society organisations are fighting such marginalisation. Miriam Miranda leads the Fraternal Organization of Black People of Honduras (OFRANEH), protecting the land rights of African-Hondurans and resisting discrimination. The activist says that women in particular are fighting for their lands in Latin America, Africa and Asia. The Oxfam report shows that many, who do so, risk their lives. In the past 60 years, more than 100 activists are said to have been killed in Honduras alone.

In 2015, OFRANEH won the US Food Sovereignty Prize, and Miranda was invited to speak at the World Bank Group. She spoke out against the Bank supporting the palm oil lobby. In her eyes, land grabs are a global issue and driven by greed. Governments bear responsibility, she says.
According to Oxfam, the issue of land tenure has recently been getting more public attention. A report by the Land Matrix Initiative (see box below) is an example. This initiative is casting light on land deals internationally by publishing extensive data.

There has been other good news, the Oxfam report adds. In 2012, the UN passed the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure, the first global guidelines on the matter. Implementation remains a challenge, according to Oxfam, but the governments of countries like Germany, France, Vietnam and the USA are keen on seeing the guidelines applied.

Moreover, civil-society organisations are increasingly putting pressure on the World Bank and other financial institutions. The Oxfam team states that some private-sector companies now understand that land grabs hurt their public image, so they have begun to operate in a more transparent manner. According to the report, an Oxfam campaign called “Behind the brands” contributed to corporations like Coca Cola or Nestlé improving their performance.

Lea Diehl

Reference

Casting light on land deals

Deals on land ownership are often concluded in secret. The Land Matrix Initiative wants to change things and make more information available to the public. The idea is to make land deals transparent and more trust-worthy.

The Initiative is focusing on the operation of transnational corporations in countries with low and middle incomes. Its website offers insights into land deals all over the world. It uses tables and graphs to provide an overview of what kind of land is used in what ways, indicating where land transactions are being planned, negotiated or enforced. The categories “reliable” and “non reliable” show that the quality of information varies.

The Land Matrix Initiative recently published this year’s annual report. It includes data concerning 1,204 finalised land deals regarding 42.2 million hectares. The numbers keep rising, however. The data was collected by a global network of non-governmental organisations, political leaders and private citizens.

The report focuses on agriculture and states that fields are predominantly used to cultivate food, though bio-fuels matter increasingly.

The experts point out that the group of countries affected by major land deals is diverse, including Indonesia, Ukraine, Russia, Papua-New Guinea or Brazil. The most affected continent, however, is Africa, and Asia is the second most affected.

The investors are from many different countries, including Malaysia, Britain, Singapore and Saudi Arabia in particular. Private-sector companies from Europe and the Middle East are said to be interested in African and Asian land, whereas competitors from emerging markets tend to invest in their own world regions.

Foreign investors often enjoy some kind of support, according to the Land Matrix Initiative, and investment funds often have a bearing on negotiations. Governments tend to support private investments in the hope of boosting the economy by generating employment or improving infrastructure. The authors point out, however, that many projects are short term and never get beyond their initial phase. The authors insist that long-term perspectives matter and socio-economic impacts must be considered.

According to the report, local people are hardly involved in the negotiation of land deals even though they suffer the impacts. More than 50 % of all land sold was previously used to grow food crops, the authors state, and that shows two things: the regions concerned are populated, and local food production depends on land.

Reference
Displaced persons

Ignored people

Today, there are more than 65 million forcibly displaced people worldwide. Many cannot return home for years. Some find refuge somewhere in their own countries, others flee abroad. Displacement has a bearing on the resolution of conflicts and means burdens for hosts the international community. Reliable data matters for humanitarian agencies and serves accountability.

Forced displacement has reached record numbers. The UN refugee agency UNHCR estimates that more than 12 million people were newly displaced in the past year. More than half of all refugees the UNHCR is responsible for come from three countries: Syria, Afghanistan and Somalia. For the second consecutive year, Turkey has been hosting the largest number: 2.5 million refugees.

In the past, displaced people used to become temporary refugees in neighbouring countries until they could safely return home. Morten Boås of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs warns, however, that war dynamics have changed and conflicts drag on without an end in sight. Consequently, host communities face high costs in the long run. The result is competition for scarce resources, with increasing tensions between refugees and poor host communities.

To some extent, refugees mean business opportunities, Boås says. For example, traders in the Sahel town of Agadez in Niger sell goods to refugees at high prices. Transporting people becomes ever more important and blurs into people smuggling. Crime such as human trafficking can intensify too, according to Boås. Moreover, crime can increase too.

High refugee numbers have an impact on global affairs, Boås says. For example, Turkey has gained enormous political influence because it can restrain the numbers of people who flee to the EU.

Displacement creates specific vulnerabilities, mostly due to a lack of social protection. Internally displaced persons (IDPs) hardly fare better than cross-border refugees, but they get much less attention because they are not refugees by definition, says Elisabeth Ferries of Georgetown University in Washington DC. Refugees are considered an international issue, she says, while IDPs are a domestic one. There is no international response to internal displacement. According to the UNHCR, however, about 8.6 million individuals were displaced within their own countries last year.

Ferries argues that host communities need support, whether they take in refugees or IDPs. Humanitarian aid is not enough, she adds, as long term solutions are needed. As international borders are becoming harder to cross, IDP numbers are probably growing – and their fate worsening, Ferries says. A serious problem in her eyes is that statistics are unreliable, with population growth compounding the problem.

Esther Meininghaus of the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) agrees. She says better data is needed to monitoring the effectiveness of aid. Moreover, she calls for mechanisms of accountability. She concedes, however, that aid delivery is a more urgent task in emergencies than data collection.

According to Meininghaus, it makes a difference whether people flee from danger and can choose their destination or whether they are forcibly relocated to a place. Making matters worse, many persons are displaced more than once. All too often, they lack accommodation and support. Many become mentally and physically exhausted, as Meininghaus told a BICC-conference in Bonn in November.

BICC director Conrad Schetter says that refugees’ aspirations and experiences are often ignored, even though they would matter in attempts to build and keep peace. In his eyes, it is wrong to see them basically as masses who will return home once there is no more war, since they must be involved in bringing about peace.

Floreana Miesen


Link
A slim majority of Colombians rejected the government’s peace agreement with the FARC rebels in a referendum in October. Now a new agreement has been signed. Dealing with crimes committed by FARC fighters is only one of the big challenges.

Colombia’s President Juan Manuel Santos and FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – revolutionary armed forces of Colombia) leader Rodrigo Londoño signed the new agreement on 24 November. It is the second one, and it is marked by more pragmatism and less euphoria. There will not be another referendum. Colombia’s Congress is supposed to ratify the agreement.

The first agreement was signed in September, but – in a surprising development – not accepted in the referendum. Voter turnout was a mere 37.4 %. Political leaders and civil-society organisations failed to rally the masses for peace.

The wounds are deep, and the country is split. Many Colombians think that FARC fighters deserve harsher punishment than was foreseen by the first agreement. Álvaro Uribe, the former president, and his party Centro Democratico campaigned for “No”. Justice as defined by the new agreement is more stringent.

Colombian society wants to see the criminals in prison “within five minutes”, according to María Clara Galvis Patiño of the UN Committee on Enforced Disappearances. She told a conference hosted by Heinrich-Böll-Foundation in Berlin that jail terms are considered a panacea. She bemoans the tendency of demonising the guerilleros and glorifying the security forces, even though the military and paramilitary troops also committed crimes in the civil war.

It is a huge challenge to organise a peace process in a manner that satisfies all parties concerned. According to the new agreement, there will be a land reform, combatants will surrender their arms and become reintegrated in society, and a transitional justice system will be geared to the truth and the compensation of losses. Controversial issues are still that the FARC is set to become a political party and that fighters who confess will not be sent to prison but must only do labour service. The related clauses cannot be renegotiated, however, they were the price to pay for peace.

Those combatants who help to investigate crimes and report where victims were killed and buried will be sentenced to up to eight years of labour service, and their personal freedoms will be restricted. The new agreement also spells out that FARC fighters must reveal their assets and use their personal wealth to compensate victims or victims’ relatives.

In the conflict, 6 million Colombians were displaced. More than 260,000 were killed, and thousands were tortured and raped. According to a study that was recently published by the Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 60,630 Menschen “disappeared”. Yanette Bautista, an activist, demands that not only the FARC, but government forces and paramilitary troops must provide information relating to the fates of the persons concerned. Soldiers killed thousands of young men claiming they were guerilleros in order to demonstrate success and collect government rewards.

The clauses of the new agreement reflect some 500 proposals that were made by citizens, the opposition and victims organisations. It is a framework agreement, as many details must yet be hammered out. Colombia’s future now depends on the agreement’s public acceptance and implementation.

Bautista says the current situation is marked by “hopes and fears” and rather “difficult”. In her eyes, it is essential to avoid what happened in Guatemala and El Salvador, where transitions from civil war led to new conflicts. International monitoring is important, she adds.

Critics worry that FARC fighters may now join criminal gangs or other forces that might fill the vacuum left behind by FARC, for instance in the illegal drugs business. Powerful networks of paramilitary units, land owners and politicians, who resent socially just land reforms and leftist political activism, may also block reconciliation. Colombia’s second strongest rebel militia, the ELN (Ejército de Liberación Nacional) has been observing developments – and will pay attention to implementation of the peace agreement.

Sonja Peteranderl

When President Manuel Santos was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in October, his supporters decorated government buildings with white roses.
Urbanisation

New visions

The title of Einhard Schmidt-Kallert’s new book is “Magnet Stadt” (magnet city). It assesses urbanisation trends in the global south. Doing so is “risky business”, the retired professor of TU Dortmund University points out, since neither the industrialisation-led urbanisation patterns typical of the northern countries, nor concepts such as “urbanisation in poverty” which were developed for southern contexts have consistent explanatory power for the entire developing world. The book’s quest is thus for overarching theories, approaches and models that fit the global south.

The first three chapters offer a general introduction to global urbanisation trends, accesses to urban life and theories of urban development. Chapters four to eleven consider urbanisation phenomena in the global south, including:

- rural-urban migration,
- housing and housing strategies of the disadvantaged,
- eviction and demolition,
- the informal sector,
- traffic and other infrastructure issues,
- children,
- violence,
- the urban fringes and
town planning.

The book, which was published shortly before the UN conference Habitat III in Quito in October, returns to the overarching question of “one, two, many pathways to the world of cities” in its final chapter.

Some chapters are told from the perspective of imaginary rural-urban migrants. They – and in many cases their daughters, sons and grandchildren – must cope with informal employment and housing. Indeed, more than half of all jobs and homes are informal in many places and countries. Conflicts with the authorities are inevitable, as informal businesses and settlements typically do not comply with every law and regulation. It takes decades to improve slums and legalise them. Demolition and eviction occur frequently in many countries.

Urban infrastructure is mostly inaccessible to newcomers from the villages. Public transport is overburdened, and there are ever more cars on the roads. Accordingly, migrants’ mobility is restricted and marked by health hazards. Moreover, people in poor neighbourhoods – and especially the children and youth – are exposed to violence.

Conventional town planning has rarely paid much attention to poor people’s needs, housing traditions and self-help strategies. “Bottom-up planning” is frequently a meaningless phrase. In many African and Asian metropolises, urbanisation means that people survive somehow by grasping whatever opportunities the city offers and cooperating with family back home in the village. Many households depend on money made in the city as well as agriculture revenues. From a European perspective, one might thus speak of incomplete town planning.

This vivid and attractive book refers to many different sources: scholars’ theories, empirical research, international and national statistics, political analyses, fiction writing and interviews. Not least, Schmidt-Kallert conveys a host of insights and observations that result from his professional work and travels.

The final chapter returns to the issue of overarching urbanisation patterns. The author concludes that, if at all, patterns can be identified for regions or countries, after considering Latin America, Africa and Asia in a kind of “round trip”. Moreover, our time’s major (urban) challenges – such as social inequality, climate change and violent conflict – take context specific forms, according to the scholar. For example, extreme exclusion and privatisation are typical of South America’s highly urbanised societies, he states, though similar trends are becoming evident in all megacities and even major towns of emerging markets.

Schmidt-Kallert does not accept the dystopia of fragmenting agglomerations, and spells out his personal utopia: in the global south’s different regions, experts and residents will develop unconventional alternatives to the currently prevalent forms of urbanisation – and these alternatives will go beyond the New Urban Agenda that Habitat III adopted in Quito in October.

Eva Dick

Reference

Africas largest city: Lagos in Nigeria.
Nowadays: Preparing for reconciliation

The Education Ministry in Libya and the Elders National Council of Reconciliation are running a project to spread a culture of tolerance in Libyan schools. It is called "Tolerance is our education." The idea is to overcome hatred, renounce violence and protect the next generation from the psychological impacts of the recent civil war.

Since 2011, Libya has suffered bloody struggles in different parts of the country. The results have been disastrous. From some towns, all residents were displaced for instance.

The project was first initiated by the Elders Council in view of the 'great dangers of the negative psychological effects of war on people in general and young people in specific," recalls Mohamed Al-Mubasher, who heads the Council. "We want to establish an atmosphere of peace."

The project has declared some regions to be priorities. "We start with the areas which directly have suffered from the armed struggles, and then we will extend our scope nationwide," Mubasher says. He knows of similar projects in other countries and says that "Libyans must learn from international experiences."

The school year 2016/17 started in late October. The Education Ministry has drafted different plans, for example, to reduce aggressive behaviour that students might have acquired from the hostile environment they live in. Ramadan Al-Ghadiwi, who works in the Ministry’s media offices, says there will be workshops, seminars and other activities. "In addition, we are printing different booklets." It all serves to promote the idea of peaceful coexistence.

Wars and armed struggles have torn the social fabric of many Libyan towns. The impact on children is evident in the pictures they draw. Many of them show violence. "That is completely natural," says Ghada Mathi, a mother of six. After all, the pictures reflect children’s experience. "Parents and schools need to create a peaceful environment for kids," she adds. "I’m doing my best to keep my kids away from such things at home, but they bring violent ideas back home from school. So the main responsibility is with the schools." She points out that children sometimes spend more time in school than at home.

Ten-year-old Farah Doukali says she wishes that her country’s people will stop the fighting. She wants them to "start looking for a better tomorrow, full of love and security."
Climate summit participants demonstrate resolve in Marrakesh in November.
Global public goods require global governance. On their own, national governments cannot rise to important challenges, including climate change, world poverty, macroeconomic stability, peace and justice, trade, infectious diseases and many others. International cooperation may be difficult – but it is the key to safeguarding a liveable planet. What needs to be done is spelled out in the Sustainable Development Goals of the UN 2030 Agenda.
The need to ratchet

Emissions of greenhouse gases respect no borders, and the impacts of climate change are felt worldwide. Climate protection is therefore a global public good. Its provision requires international cooperation and joint action. It was hard to bring about the Paris Agreement – and it is still necessary to scale up (“ratchet”) the pledges made in its context.

By Leena Srivastava and Arun Kansal

Coordinated action is hard to achieve whenever we are dealing with a public good, especially a global public good. However, as far back as in 1997, the Conference of Parties (COP) of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Kyoto reached an agreement that looked most promising. The Kyoto Protocol, as it came to be called, spelled out mandatory targets for emission reductions in developed countries, but gave them flexibility to determine how to achieve these targets.

One flexible mechanism it defined allowed developed countries to offset their own emissions by investing in emission reductions in developing countries, thus reducing their costs of meeting targets while facilitating development in disadvantaged world regions. The idea was to fix responsibility for historical emissions but also to get win-win actions. Such synergies are still important. Action must certainly take into account, that India emitted about two tonnes of carbon per year and head in 2014, while the respective figure was eight tonnes in the EU – and almost 20 tonnes in the USA. Rich economies, moreover, have more resources than poorer ones.

Nonetheless, the Kyoto Protocol failed. Some major developed countries pulled out of the agreement because governments worried that living up to their commitments would lead to competitive disadvantages. The USA never even ratified the Protocol.

The mistrust arising from this failure resulted in a failure to arrive at an agreed way forward for almost two decades after Kyoto. But climate change continued and, with each passing year, made its mitigation so much harder.

The international community continued to get fragmented and realigned into groups of countries, reflecting vulnerabilities and economic interests. To some extent, these groups overlapped. It proved very difficult to reach political consensus on how to respond to global warming and who must do so. One consequence is that humanity missed opportunities for early action. We have passed several tipping points in recent years. For example, March 2016 was the month in which the carbon dioxide content of the atmosphere rose over 400 ppm (parts per million). This is an irreversible benchmark for our lifetimes because emissions persist in the atmosphere for a long time.

Last year, the COP in Paris finally did reach an agreement – but this was when the impacts of climate change were already becoming visible and severe. It was high time. People’s trust in governments’ ability to safeguard their interest was fading and would have been shattered in the absence of a result. The downside, however, is that we still cannot say whether the Paris Agreement will indeed achieve its aspiration of limiting global warming to two degrees at most and preferably even 1.5 degrees above the levels of 1990.

Article 2 of the Paris Agreement spells out these ambitions and provides other key points. It upholds the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances”. Each country will thus determine its level of effort according to the domestic context. Apart from reducing emissions, Article 2 spells out the following goals:

■ adapting to climate change and fostering resilience,
■ promoting low-emissions development while safeguarding food security and
■ ensuring that finance flows serve these purposes.

The problem is that humanity’s chances of staying within the 2.0 degrees limit are currently estimated to be below 66%. The pledges governments have made so far would actually allow temperatures to rise by even more than four degrees on average! So, what has the Paris Agreement actually achieved?

■ First of all, it is the only successful accord since the climate summit in Kyoto in 1997. That, in itself, is important.
■ Second, it has asked signatory countries to state what they will do to protect the climate. It is hoped that, in sum, these intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs) will eventually suffice to protect the climate.
Generating scientific knowledge

Global climate debate has been driven by two major structures – the IPCC and the UNFCCC. The IPCC was established in 1988 to improve the scientific understanding of human-induced climate change, its impacts and ways to adapt to it. Its assessment reports were required to be comprehensive, objective, consensus driven and transparent. Moreover, they had to cover technical, scientific and socio-economic information.

The IPCC published its First Assessment Report in 1990. Its findings inspired the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, and one outcome of that summit was the UNFCCC.

Each new report of the IPCC has widened our collective knowledge of climate change and provided more proof that the phenomenon is indeed human-made. Scientific cooperation has thus boosted both the understanding of the complexities of challenge and the consensus on the need to act.

Its Second Assessment Report appeared in 1995 and had a major influence on the UNFCCC COP in Kyoto, resulting in the Kyoto Protocol. The most recent Assessment Report, which was released in 2014, was the fifth. By this time, most political leaders needed no further evidence on the science or impacts. The debate in the annual COPs focused completely on burden sharing, economics, growth and competitiveness.

Scientists from all over the world managed to cooperate well at the IPCC and effectively in bringing out successive assessments. But the IPCC has always had to deal with many difficulties. They include:

- language issues,
- scholars’ desire to publish in peer-reviewed journals,
- the unequal distribution of scientific capacities around the world and
- different sciences’ diverging approaches, ideas and attitudes.

Compromise was often needed to reconcile scholars from different disciplines and with different agendas. Scientific institutions in the developing world struggled to develop the same complex modelling capacities that their partners in the developed world already had. Partners from the developed world, on the other hand, failed to appreciate how important it is for developing countries to contribute to research and focus on the aspects that matter to them. They needed degrees of freedom to act and set timelines. In sum, while scientific consensus did highlight the increasing concern on climate change, it was very often watered down due to these difficulties.

However, with each new Assessment Report, capacities have visibly grown. The number of stakeholders has grown, and ever more aspects of climate change are being researched. The body of knowledge on climate change has become more systematic and precise.

Link
full drama. All in all, the IPCC has helped to drive the debate (see box, p. 13).

There is good news, however. The INDCs are a meaningful first step towards building a coherent international emission-reduction system. They go beyond what most countries would have done anyway. Moreover, the Paris Agreement has come into force within eleven months, having been ratified by a large number of countries in record time.

Policymakers are more likely to act if they see how global warming affects their countries in regard to food security, health, storm hazards and other issues. It will also help if they understand the economic opportunities of climate protection in terms of new jobs, new industries and economic growth. The more synergies are found, the easier it will be to protect the climate.

Even without the kind of mandatory national targets envisioned in Kyoto, the need for international cooperation remains great. If INDCs are to become as strong as needed, the capacities and institutions of developing countries must be strengthened. All countries must become able to draft and implement appropriate policies, and that requires capacities for research and analysis.

International cooperation on climate change is the result of many complex motivations. The greater the cooperation the greater their trust and confidence in each other. The question is: how can this international cooperation be made more effective? Further scientific research can help, but governments must certainly get their act together with the right policies and incentives.
New resolve in Marrakesh

The climate summit in Marrakesh was successful. The international community made it clear that it wants to protect the climate and the global environment in spite of Donald Trump’s election victory in the USA. All important nations are on board.

The 22nd Conference of Parties (COP) of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change had an important, but largely technical agenda. The topic was how to implement the Paris Agreement that was agreed at the COP in December last year. Many details, concerning finance for instance, need to be hammered out. Experience tells us that this kind of agenda is difficult, hence summits normally only make slow progress.

Marrakesh delivered solid results nonetheless. It appears that the agreement on implementation modalities will be finalised in 2018. It matters that the COP in Marrakesh laid the necessary foundations.

The conference had just begun when the US elections were held. The victory of Donald Trump, who had called global warming a “Chinese hoax” during the campaign, initially came as a shock. However, this shock did not result in resignation. It strengthened resolve and fostered consensus among negotiators. What Trump will do as president remains to be seen. He will probably have to accept concerns of realpolitik to some extent. To quit the Paris Agreement is legally difficult and would take years. Should he choose to do so, he would obviously alienate the entire and increasingly ambitious international community.

The COP’s response to the US elections could have been totally different, of course. Governments might have opted for some kind of “wait and see” attitude, but they chose to press ahead.

Three days earlier, the Paris Agreement had come into force at record speed, within a mere 11 months. This too is evidence of multilateral determination.

China’s attitude mattered very much in Marrakesh. Its negotiators made it very clear that backtracking is not an option. The People’s Republic declared itself ready to keep leading on climate change and environmental issues as it has been doing for many years. China’s relevance is probably still being underestimated by many – and Trump may be among them. Seven years ago, at the climate summit in Copenhagen, China had already acted in an assertive manner, emphasising its global relevance. One must not forget, moreover, that China holds huge US debts.

Germany set a good example in Marrakesh too. The Federal Government’s action plan may have been assessed controversially at home, but the COP community appreciated it. Tangible measures encourage and generate trust. Mexico, Canada and the USA also presented plans. To what extent Trump will adopt Obama’s policies is an open question, of course, but he will not be able to roll back everything. One reason is that sub-national governments, such as the one of California, the most populist and economically most important state, have set their own climate goals. Another is that renewables have become cheaper, so they are attractive in business terms. Generally speaking, climate protection can benefit massively from technological progress, for example in the fields of storing electric power or raising efficiency.

It was recently in the news that there is less ice on the seas than there has been for millennia. Moreover, the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) now estimates that 2016 will turn out to be the hottest year on record. The pressure to act is certainly growing. The fact that greenhouse gas emissions have actually not increased, but stayed more or less the same for three years in a row, gives food for thought. While this development does not suffice to prevent catastrophic climate change, it does indicate that the tipping point towards lower emissions may be close at hand.
"Historically unprecedented"

Only international cooperation can prevent looming disasters. Dirk Messner, the chair of Germany’s Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU — Wissenschaftlicher Beirat der Bundesregierung Globale Umweltveränderung), sees opportunities for success.

Dirk Messner interviewed by Hans Dembowski

We used to think that global governance is brought about by sovereign governments concluding multilateral agreements with binding rules for all partners. But that is not working, is it?

No, it isn’t. Ahead of the climate summit in Copenhagen in 2008, the WBGU prepared a study on behalf of Germany’s Federal Government. In it, we spelled out what a fair global climate regime would look like. We came up with a sensible proposal. Basically, every human being would have had the same right to emit greenhouse gases. Obviously, only a limited amount of global emissions was compatible with keeping global warming below two degrees on average, so we could calculate per-capita emission rights. On that basis, we wanted to define emission budget for every country according to its population, and emission trading would have been allowed. The approach was pragmatic and made sense, but it did not bear fruit. The international community did not agree on binding rules in Copenhagen.

Nor did the climate summit in Paris in 2015. That’s right. The Paris Agreement spells out ambitious goals, but not what must be done. Every country announces what it intends to do, and then we’ll see what it all adds up to. Either the action announced will suffice, or it needs to be scaled up.

Leena Srivastava and Arun Kansal (see p. 12) estimate the likelihood of the Paris Agreement succeeding to be below 66% because it is not binding.

Well, the probability of about two thirds is better than the zero probability we faced after Copenhagen. Climate protection actually has surprising momentum. The Paris Agreement was ratified in record time. Year after year, the International Energy Agency raises its forecasts concerning the growth of renewable energies. It recently reported that, for the first time since the industrial revolution, more than half...
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of the newly installed power generation capacity was based on renewables in 2014. Moreover, two important agreements concerning emissions were concluded in recent weeks. Airlines will offset the emissions of air-travel, and HFCs will be phased out. The current momentum really inspires hope that the goals defined in Paris may yet be met.

Are there any lessons for global governance? Well, let me say first of all that the many climate annual summits were not useless, even though they did not result in a globally binding emissions regime. What they did was facilitate a multi-layered, complex debate that helped to raise awareness internationally, and on this foundation, we are suddenly seeing a lot more action in countries, cities and private-sector businesses than we had expected. And it is entirely possible that this bottom-up dynamism will ultimately make the global climate regime more stringent too.

What has made the multi-layered debate effective? For two reasons, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) mattered a lot:

- It proved beyond doubt in scientific terms that the global climate is changing because of human interference and that this trend will have dramatic consequences if it continues unabated. Such globally produced knowledge ultimately silenced the voices that had kept spreading doubt and had often been funded by fossil industries.
- This knowledge was the result of international cooperation. Scholars from all over the world were involved in the research. Shared knowledge is basis for joint action.

Another important trend was that some countries became frontrunners: Germany, Denmark and others. China joined them about five years ago. They proved that it is possible to change the energy mix, and technology has been improving and becoming cheaper since. All this has contributed to the momentum we are witnessing now even though it seemed impossible in Copenhagen seven years ago.

Are there other success stories concerning global governance? Yes, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were very important, and I hope the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) will have a similar impact. Die MDGs were a paradigm change in development affairs. Previously, the guiding principles were defined by the Washington Consensus with its focus on making markets as free as possible. Economic growth was the only accepted yardstick of success. In contrast, the SDGs are about fighting poverty, reducing inequality, accepting the planetary boundaries and building a fair world order. It is striking that the agenda is being driven by non binding rules – the agenda is about creating joint norms and world views. What really makes the difference is the shared understanding of the goals, just the way it does in climate matters. What matters now is that diverse players insist on implementation, at national as well as international levels. It is worth emphasising that the fight against poverty has really moved
ahead everywhere, except for the countries that are rocked by war and strife.

But why didn’t global governance prevent wars?
This is a complex issue. Ironically, the successes we just discussed go along with the disintegration of global security systems. The west in general, and especially the USA, have had to learn that military interventions often do not lead to the results they are supposed to bring about. The west’s political and economic influence is decreasing, moreover – Trump will not stop, but accelerate this process. The UN Security Council reflects the distribution of power in the 20th century, not the 21st. Crises such as those in Ukraine, Syria or Libya are related to the fact that relevant powers are blocking one another instead of cooperating to bring about security for all.

You have co-edited a book on the foundations of international cooperation with your colleague Silke Weinlich (see D+C/E+Z e-Paper 2016/05, p. 4). Do the essays inspire optimism?
Well, the core issue is that cooperation has a very long history. New institutions were invented again and again. Human civilisation, the emergence of cities, societies, states and the entire international system are based on human beings’ aptitude for cooperation. Observing the history of 200,000 years of human civilisation, cooperation can be seen as the third principle of evolution, besides mutation and selection. In the evolutionary perspective, we should expect further social and institutional innovations to occur and help us to solve global problems. When structures of cooperation collapse, however, the result is violence and conflict.

And that is evident today.
Yes, it is. History tells us, however, that civilisations typically make major progress after major crises. European integration, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the United Nations all came about after two devastating world wars, for example. The underlying philosophy is much older, however. Hugo Grotius came up with the innovative idea of international law in 1625, while Europe was being ravaged by the 30 years war. In 1795, Immanuel Kant wrote ‘Perpetual peace’, in which he outlined the principles of a rules-based international order and his vision of world citizenship.

Can we afford to experience major crises in order to learn the right lessons?
The problem is that we only have one Earth. We’ll lose if we irreversibly destroy the global climate, the oceans or the world’s farmlands, for example. The international community must learn how to safeguard global public goods in international cooperation, and it must do so fast. There are three daunting challenges:
- We must not over-exploit the planet, well knowing that the world population is set to grow to 9 billion people by 2050.
- Western hegemony is increasingly a thing of the past.
- The intricately networked world economy and global society needs to be governed in ways that make it possible to balance interests within nations and between them.

The rise of populist leaders, most prominently Donald Trump in the USA, is a consequence of the dissatisfaction many people feel. The scenario is extremely risky.

So dramatic global crises cannot be prevented?
There is no guarantee that things will go well, but there is no guarantee that they will go wrong either. Feeling gloomy does not help. We must do our best to find fair solutions and prevent major crises. Once more, climate protection offers a ray of light. The risks of global warming are actually quite hard to grasp. Scientists warn of dangers that will occur decades from now. We do not experience the climate, but only weather in our daily lives. It is historically unprecedented – and quite promising – that the world community has begun to protect the climate with preventive action in such a setting. Perhaps we are in the process of learning how to tackle global problems in time.

Who can contribute to facilitating the kind of learning we need?
International exchange is certainly essential for generating shared knowledge, for understanding different viewpoints and for finding fair solutions. Politics, science, economics and the media can all make a difference.
Insurances beat begging bowl

International agencies can help countries to manage climate risks. Promising examples are the African Risk Capacity and the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility. They are based on the cooperation of regional governments.

Malawi has its share of the climate-change impacts, says Ronald Mangani, secretary to the country’s treasury. According to the top bureaucrat, his government is aware of the challenges and wants to prepare for disasters. One way of doing so was to become a member of the African Risk Capacity (ARC), a specialised AU agency that serves to pool and transfer risks in a continent-spanning climate response system.

The ARC is basically an insurance system. It is supported by Germany and Britain, and a part of the risk is covered by private-sector insurance companies. On behalf of Germany’s Federal Government, KfW Development Bank has contributed $50 million.

So far, the ARC sells African government insurances to protect their people from the impacts of drought. Other insurance schemes will follow – against the impact of storms, for example.

The ARC is meant to pay out money when rains fail. However, when 8.5 million Malawian farmers were hit by draught this year, the ARC initially refused to pay. Secretary Mangani knows the reasons. The ARC assumed that the farmers were cultivating a different kind of maize than they actually were. If they had grown maize of 120 day maturity, as the ARC believed, the crop would have been saved by late rains. But in actual fact, the harvest failed because the shorter-maturity plants had already dried up. After having understood the situation better, the ARC management recently decided to pay out $8.1 million in disaster relief, Mangani reports. He appreciates the ARC’s willingness to learn. Last year, three other countries benefited from ARC membership. Together, Senegal, Mauritania and Niger got $23 million because of draught. Between them, they had paid $8 million for insurance policies.

In 2016, moreover, the government of Haiti received almost $20 million from a similar scheme, which is called the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF), after the island nation was hit by Hurricane Matthew. CCRIF paid another $9 million to other governments in the affected region.

The insurance approach makes sense, says Stefan Dercon, the chief economist of Britain’s Department for International Development (DFID), because it “creates certainty in an uncertain world”. In his eyes, it is remarkable that, thanks to CCRIF, Haiti received money two weeks after the hurricane struck. In the past, disaster relief was typically the result of extended negotiations, involving charitable organisations and donor governments. The “begging bowl” was the basic approach, according to Dercon, with “12th century finance” being used to deal with “21st century problems”.

Dercon points out that having to beg for humanitarian support is not only deeply embarrassing for the governments concerned. It is also time consuming and leads to sub-optimal results. Governments are tempted to cry wolf and to free ride, he says. Moreover, information is scant and coordination inadequate. The economist says it is much better to conclude contracts that spell out precisely what amounts of money will flow in what kind of disaster circumstances. In Dercon’s words, this kind of disaster relief can be “fast and rules-based”.

There are serious challenges, of course. As the example of Malawi shows, scenarios are not always understood well beforehand. Solid data matter, but are not available everywhere. Providing money to governments, moreover, is insufficient for solving the problems of people hit by disaster. Dercon worries that Haiti may not use its money well. Its government, after all, is “one of the weakest on Earth”.

Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) appreciates the developmental potential of insurance schemes. As Ingrid-Gabriela Hoven, a director-general at the BMZ, told a conference hosted by KfW in Frankfurt in November, now is “the perfect time to focus on insurance”. One reason is that insurance schemes can contribute to managing climate risks, which are expected to increase. In a more general sense, Hoven wants insurance to become “embedded in the development-policy agenda”. She says, for example, that “smart subsidies” for insurance coverage can contribute to providing social protection to poor people, without endangering financial sustainability or creating moral hazard.

After Hurricane Matthew, Haiti’s government got $20 million insurance payments in record time.
The G20 – the group of the 20 most important industrialised and emerging economies – has indicated its support for the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. It must now specify how it will contribute to achieving social, environmental, financial and politico-economic goals and thus make the Agenda a core focus of its work.

By Kathrin Berensmann

The G20 consists of the 19 largest industrialised and emerging economies plus the European Union. It represents around two-thirds of the world population and approximately 86% of global gross domestic product. G20 decisions are taken at the highest political level, because the heads of state and government have been representing their countries at G20 summits since 2008. Nonetheless, the G20 is an informal forum without a permanent secretariat. Its decisions are not legally binding (Berensmann et al. 2011).

As a global politico-economic coordination forum, the G20 can play a central role in the implementation of the 2030 Agenda. This applies to the Agenda’s principles (such as universality, leave no one behind, indivisibility, coordination of objectives, accountability) as well as the Agenda’s 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

Due to its informal character, the G20 does not have a direct bearing on international organisations, but an indirect one through its member countries. Thanks to its political and economic clout, it can set important political signals (Fischer 2015). At the same time, it is committing its members to be serious about implementing the Agenda domestically. Obviously, the G20’s endorsement of the 2030 Agenda sends an important message to non-G20 countries.

In a recent Comprehensive Accountability Report, the G20 Development Working Group stated that it is tackling several aspects of the 2030 Agenda – including the SDGs and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda.
on financing for development. Above all, it is dealing with the issues of domestic resource mobilisation, financial inclusion and remittances as well as infrastructure investments.

Several SDGs are not covered by the Development Working Group, but by other G20 working groups. They include, for example, social protection, private-sector investments and employment, trade and Aid for Trade (G20 2016b).

The G20 Action Plan

At their summit in Hangzhou in September 2016, the G20 heads of state and government agreed on a G20 Action Plan for the 2030 Agenda, pledging to further align G20 policymaking with the Agenda. The Action Plan’s political preamble emphasises the innovative principles of the Agenda. It pledges G20 action to reach the SDGs and implement the Addis Ababa Action Agenda.

The Action Plan is geared to 15 Sustainable Development Sectors. They are not congruent with the SDGs, but based on the G20’s previous development agendas and areas of action, as were spelled out in the Seoul Development Consensus (2010), the St. Petersburg Development Outlook (2013) and the Low-Income Developing Countries Framework (2015). Nonetheless, the Sustainable Development Sectors certainly fit the G20 Agenda for strong, sustainable and balanced growth.

The new task of the G20 Development Working Group

The G20 Action Plan has the same timeframe as the 2030 Agenda. In order for the Action Plan to remain flexible, however, future G20 presidencies can adapt it to new requirements, experiences and challenges. The G20 acknowledges that the 2030 Agenda’s follow-up and review process is UN-led (G20 2016a).
The Action Plan has considerably expanded the mandate of the G20 Development Working Group. The Group now serves a dual function. On the one hand, it is still in charge of support for low-income countries. On the other, it is responsible for coordinating the implementation of the 2030 Agenda with the other G20 working groups (Berensmann 2016).

The second role is new and broadens the horizon of the Working Group. It’s mandate is no longer limited to north-south relations, but also includes south-south and north-north relations. This is in line with the SDGs.

The Action Plan is a clear indication of the G20’s support for sustainable development (Clark 2016). At the same time, it provides a normative framework for achieving the SDGs (Berger/Wolf 2016). Given the G20’s longstanding focus on conventional economic growth, it is noteworthy that the G20 takes account of sustainability in all of its three dimensions – social, economic and environmental. In the future, the G20 wants the Development Working Group to discuss progress concerning the implementation of the 2030 Agenda in its accountability reports (G20 2016a). This is an implicit commitment not only to support the 2030 Agenda, but also to facilitate public scrutiny of relevant efforts.

Moreover, the Action Plan is a contribution to building a global partnership in line with SDG 17. The G20 has stated that it will cooperate with actors beyond its membership on implementing the Action Plan. Relevant partners are the governments of low-income countries in particular, but civil society, the scientific community and the private sector matter too (G20 2016a). Since the G20 is embracing the universal approach of the 2030 Agenda, it no longer makes sense to accuse it of mere “club governance” that only serves members’ interests. The G20 has gained legitimacy. Its universal approach is a response to significant criticism regarding its institutional structure and operations.

### Challenges of the G20 Action Plan

Compared with many other of G20 action plans, the Action Plan for the 2030 Agenda is imprecise. So far, neither tangible actions nor timeframes have been specified (Martens 2016). However, the G20 Development Working Group is to fill this gap by the next summit in July 2017 in cooperation with the other working groups (G20 2016a). It has been asked to draw up a comprehensive and concrete list of initiatives.

It is a huge challenge to coordinate the many G20 working groups, and so is managing the Development Working Group’s various tasks (Berensmann 2016). If the group’s different workstreams do not cooperate well, there is a risk of duplication, which would result in lower effectiveness and efficiency. Accordingly, the recent accountability report demands that the political coordination of the workstreams must improve (G20 2016b).

The G20 Action Plan for the 2030 Agenda only describes some of the relevant efforts. It must not be equated with the entire implementation effort of all members. It would fit the G20’s character if it strived for tangible change in regard to economic, fiscal and financial policy with an eye to gearing global economic governance to the 2030 Agenda.

### The role of Germany

The Federal Republic of Germany will take over the G20 presidency from China in 2017. It would do well to continue the work on the Action Plan and shape G20 activities in a tangible way. The 15 Sustainable Development Sectors announced thus far offer useful reference points. Moreover, Germany’s Federal Government could illustrate that the G20 takes its commitment to the global common good seriously by organising events with various actors (civil society, the private sector, the scientific community) and with non-G20 governments.

In addition, the G20 governments could spell out concrete concepts for implementation at the national level (Kloke-Lesch 2015). Germany could assume a frontrunner role, setting an example on implementing the 2030 Agenda. It is important, in this context, to develop a common system for preparing national implementation reports concerning the 2030 Agenda.

### References


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A paradigm change at the IMF?

Inequality has been rising all over the world in recent years. As US President Barack Obama pointed out some time ago, the reduction of economic inequality is the “defining challenge of our time”. This is true not only for the USA, but many countries. In the developing world, rising economic inequality has been a pervasive feature for decades. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) may have taken note.

Complete equality of income and wealth is neither achievable nor desirable. However, extreme inequality is unhealthy for several reasons:

- It jeopardises moral equality and thus undermines democratic principles (“all people are created equal”). Greater economic inequality, moreover, implies less equality of opportunities. Equal access to schools, the judiciary and other nominally public goods may not be guaranteed anymore. The more a country is stratified, the stronger extremist movements become, as the rise of populist leaders in the USA and other countries shows.

- Pronounced economic inequality may cause macroeconomic imbalances that, in turn, may harm the global macroeconomic system. This is the case when a country excessively relies on credits to pay for consumption, as is typical of the USA, or when a country exports excessively, as China and Germany do.

For a long time, however, the policymakers of most industrialised countries did not consider inequality a pressing issue. To some extent, the reason for this was that their countries’ middle classes were large and prosperous. With the rise of the neoliberal era governments increasingly adopted market-radical approaches, and so did the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.

The IMF and the Bank argued that abolishing trade barriers, liberalising financial markets and opening economies would unleash market forces and lead to more efficient resource allocation and growing prosperity (“Washington Consensus”). Today, it is widely appreciated that this approach has failed.

The IMF basically used a “one-size-fits-all” approach, often in neglect of important country specifics. Moreover, it failed to consider how the benefits of growth might be shared. Though IMF research showed at the time that income inequality can be a drag on growth, reducing inequality was not among the Fund’s goals. In retrospect, this was perhaps the most important failure.

In the new millennium, the IMF began to reassess its past performance. A new era began when Olivier Blanchard became its chief economist in 2008. During his tenure, IMF research challenged orthodox policy prescriptions. His team insisted that a government’s deficit spending must boost weak aggregate demand during recessions. The IMF published various self-critical studies. Maurice Obstfeld, its current chief economist, shares many of Blanchard’s views.

Recent IMF studies argue that income inequality, private-sector indebtedness and financial instability are linked phenomena. It also thwarts progress towards universal access to education and health, thus the long-term growth potential because people are not as healthy and well trained as they could be. Ultimately, extreme inequality can undermine political stability.

In 2008, the world economy was on the brink of a second Great Depression, which was then averted by deficit spending in major economies. Nonetheless, the crisis had important distributional impacts. Unemployment, especially of low-skilled workers, soared in an unprecedented manner, and income gaps grew accordingly. Once depression no longer loomed, however, strict austerity set in. The idea was to reduce government debt once more, but the policy particularly hurt those at the lower end of the income scale.

The big question is whether the IMF’s new intellectual interest in reducing inequality will translate into a different policy approach in future renegotiations of government debt. Its rhetoric has certainly changed. That makes sense in view of the current zeitgeist and the visibility of grassroots movements such as Occupy Wall Street, the indignados movement in Spain (from which the left-wing party Podemos emerged) or the rise of extremist right-wing populism. That the IMF management has been insisting on debt relief for Greece since the summer of 2015 may be a sign of a real paradigm shift. On the other hand, it has close ties to the financial sector and is dominated by the established economic powers, so it may still prove to be inherently conservative.
African governments are challenging the legitimacy of the International Criminal Court (ICC), accusing it of being biased against their continent. Three have declared their countries’ intention to cease being ICC members. The African Union (AU), moreover, has been criticising the ICC for years, and its arguments deserve attention. A balanced debate concerning the future of international criminal justice is needed.

By Darleen Seda

The Nuremberg Trials in 1946 after World War II are considered the birthplace of international criminal law (ICL). For the first time, individuals were prosecuted for ‘new’ crimes – crimes that had not been defined as such when they were committed. Also for the first time, defendants were tried for crimes against peace, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Several Nazi leaders were found guilty, and some were hanged.

Previously, only states, but not individual persons, had been subjects to international law. An important Nuremberg judgment included the statement that “crimes under international law are committed by men, not abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced”.

The Nuremberg International Military Tribunal laid the foundation for the establishment of subsequent tribunals including the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo Tribunal) in 1946, the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda (1994) or for former Yugoslavia (1993). In 1998, the ICC was established as a permanent institution.

International mandate

The principle of sovereignty under international law confers sovereign states with the power, authority, rights and duties to manage their own people and territory. States have the duty to prosecute persons who commit crimes within their jurisdiction. After World War II, however, the international community

Russia, the Philippines and the USA

In November, the presidents of Russia and the Philippines cast doubt on the International Criminal Court (ICC). The announcements made by Vladimir Putin and Rodrigo Duterte, however, are probably less important than one made by the court’s prosecutors: they are considering investigations against US troops.

Though Russia signed up to the ICC, it never ratified and is thus not a full member. Accordingly, withdrawing the signature is not legally relevant. It is obvious why Putin wants to discredit the ICC however. Russia is involved in Syrian and Ukrainian violence, and Putin does not want any kind of international scrutiny of crimes of this sort. The ICC’s weakest point is that leading powers – including the USA and China – have not joined, so it does not have jurisdiction over them.

The Philippines is a full ICC member, but like his Russian counterpart, President Duterte resents foreign criticism. His approach to fighting crime is murderous. Human Rights Watch estimates that some 5000 were killed by security forces and armed gangs in what Duterte calls his “war against drugs” since he took office in summer. However, ICC membership is probably not up to Duterte. His country’s Senate ratified membership, so it should have a say in the matter.

ICC prosecutors have long argued that US troops may have tortured captives in Afghanistan in 2003 and 2004. They recently announced they may start investigations and that the decision is “imminent”. Unlike the USA, Afghanistan is an ICC member, so the court has jurisdiction over crimes committed on its territory if those crimes are not dealt with by national courts. If the prosecutors’ case is strong enough, they should start investigations. That would boost the ICC’s reputation. So far, it is too often seen to only tackle the crimes of people and leaders from Africa.
felt it had to act in cases when states were unable or unwilling to take culprits to court. The setting up of international criminal tribunals – including the ICC – was thus guided by the notion that serious crimes undermine international peace and security and must therefore not go unpunished.

Today, the relationship between African governments and the emerging regime of international criminal law is at a crossroads. Burundi, South Africa and Gambia have announced they will quit the ICC. To some extent, these decisions are self-serving. For example, Burundi’s President Pierre Nkurunziza is obviously irritated by the ICC having begun to investigate the violence that has been rocking his country since he declared he would cling on to a third term in office early last year.

On the other hand, the AU has repeatedly criticised the ICC since 2009, when it issued the first arrest warrant for Sudan’s President Omar al-Bashir, accusing him of genocidal violence in his country’s Darfur region. The tensions increased when Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto, who had been indicted for Kenya’s 2007/08 post-election violence, became the country’s president and deputy president in 2013.

The growing tensions are worrying in regard to Africa’s development and the application of international criminal justice. Some of the worst atrocities of the past decades have been committed in Africa, mostly by Africans themselves, and always with African victims. Some of the architects of these atrocities have been held to account. Among them are those responsible for the violence under South-African apartheid, the Rwandan genocide and most recently Hissène Habré of Chad.

Africa is not, of course, the only place where atrocities have occurred. Of those committed in Europe,
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Asia and the Americas, some have been addressed, but many have not. One reason is that only the UN Security Council can initiate ICC proceedings if a country is not an ICC member. Syria, for example, never joined, while most African countries did.

To explain tensions between African governments and the ICC, some observers have suggested that the conception of justice in Africa differs from the one adopted by the international community. Proponents of this argument claim that the “western” conception of justice is being forced upon Africans. However, the concept of justice is not only contentious in Africa but everywhere. There is a collective understanding that individuals are to be held accountable for their crimes and that their victims deserve some form of redress. This notion is broad and imprecise, however. The details are what prove contentious.

**Contentious issues**

Following the indictments of al-Bashir, Kenyatta and Ruto (the latter have since been withdrawn), the AU raised a number of challenging arguments. Most important, it claimed that the indictments could jeopardise ongoing efforts to bring about peace and thus cause further destabilisation.

This line of reasoning cannot be easily dismissed. Indeed, punitive forms of accountability may harm efforts to end a conflict, build national unity and bring about reconciliation. Quite obviously, indicting current heads of states and government or other senior officials may destroy the ability of the governments concerned to perform basic functions.

In the case of Kenyatta and Ruto, it was argued that Kenya was a fragile state in view of the post-election violence that had erupted in 2007/08 and that things might get even worse in the absence of its top government leaders. The implication was that elected officials must not be taken to court so long as they hold office. An underlying problem, of course, was that the ICC prosecutor was accusing Kenyatta and Ruto of having contributed to the 2007/08 election violence. Not tackling that history meant leaving Kenya in the hands of the very men who were suspected of having caused its fragility.

A particular irony of the matter was that both indicted politicians had promised to cooperate with the ICC during the election campaign of 2013, but argued that the ICC was interfering in Kenya’s sovereignty once they were in office. It is true that Kenyatta and Ruto were opponents in 2007/08, but even the fact that their joint ticket won a majority in the elections five years later does little to make people who were victimised by the rioting feel safe.

African observers, moreover, state that the ICC is continuously “targeting” Africa and that this attitude is an expression of its western bias. In this view, the international criminal justice system is divided into two: the rich and powerful countries on the one hand and the less powerful countries on the other hand. International criminal justice is thus blamed of hypocrisy.

Such criticism is based on legitimate as well as illegitimate concerns. It is, however, difficult to discern that the ICC has a fundamental anti-African bias. Many cases brought to the court were self-referrals by African countries concerned. Only two situations (Sudan and Libya) were referred by the UN Security Council (UNSC), and another two (Kenya and Cote d’Ivoire) were referred by the ICC prosecutor. Clearly, the ICC should not be accused of bias when it is acting on behalf of the UNSC, and even less when the countries concerned move it.

The AU plans to extend the jurisdiction of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights to include international law and transnational law crimes (see box, p. 26). This is a worthy initiative and may contribute to improving development of international criminal justice. It will not be a substitute for the ICC, however. The three African governments that plan to quit the ICC did not point to the proposed African Court’s role in pursuing criminal accountability especially for international crimes. Their announcements show a disinterest in criminal accountability at the international, regional or domestic level. The choice of three individual governments, however, is not a pan-African one.
Global collective

The child-relief agency terre des hommes Germany (TDH) involves partner organisations from Africa, Asia and Latin America in decision-making regarding strategic goals. As a recent evaluation has shown, most of those who take part appreciate this confidence-building approach which facilitates interaction on an equal footing.

The evaluation was done by a political scientist from the University of Kassel. Fifteen persons from project regions – core staff as well as unpaid volunteers – were questioned in qualitative interviews. The majority appreciated the TDH model and said it increased the sense of ownership. In their eyes, it has made consensus on work methods and content broader. Synergies and alliances have evolved at the global level, strengthening a shared sense of community between partners from north and south, according to the interviewees.

Participation in TDH decision-making occurs at a conference of delegates which takes place every five years. Different constituents (core staff and volunteers, youth networks) from partner organisations are involved. The conference determines TDH’s strategic goals and guiding principles and therefore requires thorough preparation and considerate follow-up.

There are national TDH platforms in partner countries. They give scope to substantive debate. Moreover, they send delegates to world-region meetings which also make proposals concerning priorities and tangible action. Those who take part in the TDH delegate conference in Germany are active at either level.

Some national and regional platforms perform better than others, which no doubt is linked to cultural differences. The essential thing, however, is that the global structure serves to foster debate on issues that concern children. Promoting children’s rights and fighting child labour are core concerns of TDH. A new approach is to promote children’s environmental rights, and it has caused excited discussions. One result was a new campaign called “Our rivers, our lives”, which is run by the regional network Southeast Asia and has attracted attention all the way up to the UN level.

Youth involvement in decision-making is particularly important. With the support of full-time staff, TDH has built an international youth network. It relies on the internet, but members also meet in person sometimes. They belong to the national platforms, but organise their own meetings on top of that.

The evaluation revealed two points of dissatisfaction, however. Interviewees said that the delegate conference took too long and that collective decision-making should also apply to budget matters. When it comes to money, TDH is accountable to its donors, so financial decisions are predominately taken at the German headquarters. This friction cannot be solved easily.

The costs of the participatory approach are also a matter of concern. Some interviewees from both north and south said it might be better to fund more projects instead of investing heavily in collective decision-making. Most of the surveyed persons did not agree, however. German volunteers tended to argue that involving partners in decision-making is part of what makes TDH special.

The interviewees were cautious about recommending the TDH model as a starting point for shaping north-south relationships in a better way. They did say it contributed to better mutual understanding and facilitated south-south exchange, however.

TDH’s participation model is fully operational and has a positive bearing on the agency’s work. A sound system of critique and constructive interaction ensure that the organisation’s strategic goals are defined sensibly and implemented well.
Globalisation has changed the world more than many international policymakers like to admit. In coming years, the transformation will continue with even greater force. Germany and Europe must prepare accordingly, or they will not be able to shape this transformation.

By Eckhard Deutscher and Erich Stather

There has been some progress in the global arena. Examples include the Millennium Development Goals (2000) and their successors, the Sustainable Development Goals (2015), the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) and the Paris Agreement concerning climate change (2015). Nonetheless, there are undesirable developments as well, and they are becoming increasingly irritating.

Reversing this trend must begin in Europe. Today, every EU member nation is pursuing a foreign, security and development policy of its own. These national policies must become a single, common policy in the future. Otherwise, the EU will not be able to exert influence in multilateral organisations – such as the UN, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the recent establishment of which was promoted by China. The EU must speak with one voice. With Donald Trump in the White House, moreover, the EU will no longer be able to rely on the west’s leading power sorting things out reasonably.

Overhaul needed

Overfishing is a global issue: Japanese trawler competing with African fishing boat near Senegal’s coast.
So far, development policies focus on egotistical national concerns. Donor countries – including the EU members – have still not harmonised their action through coherent international reforms as would fit the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. At the same time, new donors show only little interest in the Aid Effectiveness criteria, many partners in Asia, Africa and Latin America accept their approach, whilst criticising the failure of the established donors to comply ever more often and ever more openly.

The challenges Europe will face in the next decades require fundamental reforms. Conventional development aid for poor countries will still be necessary for some time. However, those countries’ integration into regional and global markets should become ever more successful. For the sake of the global commons, donor governments must not remain focused on reducing poverty. Strategic investments to safeguard global public goods are needed. Relevant issues include deforestation, overfished oceans, the stability of financial markets or climate change. Other important matters are the promotion of human rights and good governance as well as the fight against corruption. Unfortunately, they no longer pertained to overseas development. Today, democracy and human rights must be defended within the EU itself.

Reforms are necessary, particularly in Europe, and not only in regard to official development assistance (ODA). They are needed in other fields of policymaking as well. The fragmentation of international cooperation efforts keeps getting worse, which is anachronistic, inefficient and costly. Due to national self-interests, there are countless agencies, some two dozen development banks and hundreds of multilateral programmes. Such complexity does not deliver convincing results.

It would make sense to transfer the competence for bilateral ODA to the European Commission in Brussels. EU members should follow the suggestion of Michel Camdessus, the former managing director of the IMF, and set up a European development bank. Its nucleus – or model – could be Germany’s KfW. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the European Investment Bank (EIB) should be merged into this new institution.

The national development agencies of EU members would no longer be recipients of funding from their governments. Instead, they would compete in tenders for the implementation of international projects. Competition serves quality, as is well understood. Obviously, strong and successful national agencies such as Germany’s GIZ could work on behalf of the EU. In Germany, the Foreign Office and the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) should be replaced by a new ministry. The jurisdiction of this new department would be national coordination of all issues of global policymaking, including responsibility for ODA resources and conventional foreign policy. It would also be responsible for cooperation with international non-governmental organisations.

In many respects, the new ministry would be more like the current BMZ than the current Foreign Office. After all, its most important task would not be to represent specifically German interests. Its mandate would be to promote the international common good. In any case, the foreign policies of individual EU members will become increasingly irrelevant the more European foreign policy becomes a common one and is represented by the European diplomatic service.

Sceptics may argue that it is an illusion to think the EU can adopt a common foreign policy in times of growing populism. As evidence, they will point to Britain’s vote to leave the EU in the referendum in June. However, the notion that 28 nation states – each one on its own – will influence the ongoing global change in a way that serves particular national interests is absurd. Yes, Brexit is a setback for the EU, but it may yet prove to be an opportunity. For example, London has always resisted closer military cooperation in the EU context. Military cooperation is a difficult and controversial issue, but it must be considered carefully in the light of a common foreign, security and development policy.

In relation to development affairs, efficacy and efficiency matter more than the sheer volume of funding. The obsessive interest in raising ODA expenditure to 0.7% of gross national income is not helpful. Instead, all donor governments, including the “new” ones, should commit to investing five percent of their national budgets in international projects, especially in safeguarding global public goods.

At the same time, the effectiveness of ODA must finally be measured and evaluated better. So far, nations are basically evaluating their own efforts with questionable methods. Instead, partner countries and independent international experts should carry out impact analyses of development programmes according to uniform standards.

True partnership and responsible ownership must replace donors’ developmental paternalism. Recipient countries increasingly reject the ODA approaches of OECD countries, and the criticism of African researchers and government officials cannot be simply ignored. It is bizarre that country desks of donor governments sometimes have more influence on the development of far-away countries than the national authorities of those places. Budget support (especially to promote specific sectors) and joint financing must be prioritised over conventional cooperation programmes and projects. Moreover, transparency and accountability must improve.
Take agencies by their word

An international think tank believes that aid effectiveness would improve if recipients had a better understanding of how aid agencies tick. It published a guide for recipients. More must happen.

The job of the Institute for Integrated Transitions (IFIT) is to help countries move on from war or authoritarian rule to democracy. It has recently published a booklet with the title “Navigating international aid in transitions”. Overviews are available in English, Spanish, French and Arabic. IFIT is based in Barcelona and supported by the UNDP, various governments (including Germany’s) and private foundations.

The booklet argues that aid recipients are overwhelmed by the multitude of agencies that offer support after a civil war or after an authoritarian regime has ended. To make the most of aid, the recipients need to know who they are dealing with and what to expect of partners. Accordingly, the authors spell out how bilateral organisations differ from multilateral ones and how profit-making agencies differ from non-profits. It admits that the distinctions are not always clear cut, for instance, when a government agency is registered as a private-sector company which is owned by the state. The booklet also provides a short overview of what tools aid agencies use – from budget support to staff training.

The authors point out common misconceptions. Examples include:

- Western donors are naïve to expect innovative information technology to always serve democratisation. It can also serve disinformation.
- The young generation is not always a force for a more open society. Traumatised youngsters can just as well develop a longing for the kind of security that strongmen promise.
- Elections, moreover, do not always lead to more accountability. If relevant forces are suspected of manipulating the event, elections may trigger violence and exacerbate distrust. The most important point, however, is that “all good things” do not always go together. In the 1990s, donor governments and aid agencies generally believed that market economies and democracies go hand in hand. An often ignored implication, as the IFIT warns, is that botched economic reforms will thwart the transition to democracy.

The IFIT publication is candid, and many aid agencies will probably disagree with some of its findings. They are likely to find one section particularly irritating. It deals with agencies reiterating “chronic resolutions for doing better”, but rarely fulfilling the related pledges of “breaking down silos”, “ensuring local ownership” or “increasing transparency”, for example.

The booklet explains accurately why agencies struggle to live up to such promises and invites aid recipients to take them at their word. The authors probably underestimate the challenge. The key problem is not ignorance of the recipients’ side, but their recent experience of arbitrary rule and violence. It is likely to keep them from speaking up to paymasters about double standards.

It takes courage to speak truth to power. People who have just escaped civil war or authoritarian rule are neither used to the freedom of speech nor the rule of law. Moreover, they are fully aware of leaders’ beautiful rhetoric which often proved wrong by brutal behaviour. The mindset of aid-agency staff is different of course, fostered in democratic societies. But it matters that their partners are used to despotism.

The IFIT publication encourages aid recipients to deal with aid agencies in the same way that self-confident citizens of established democracies deal with state authorities. This is a valid goal, but it is not an attitude that is likely in the early phases of a transition from civil war or authoritarian rule. The booklet certainly deserves the attention of aid recipients, but aid agencies must take it to heart too. They face the serious and counter-intuitive dilemma of having to encourage partners to be hard on them.

Link
Navigating international aid in transitions:
A country’s parliament generates an opposition view to every government policy. This kind of debate guides the media. Ideas of international global goods are hardly promoted, however. That is so even within the EU, which has pooled policy-making in many areas.

By Hans Dembowski

A simple book sleeve exemplifies the problem. The book was published in Germany in 2016. It documents conversations two prominent journalists from Germany and France had with the finance ministers of both countries. In German book stores, however, customers only see the names of Wolfgang Schäuble and Ulrich Wickert on the cover, because a separate little sleeve, which displays their faces, hides the names of their French counterparts, Michel Sapin and Dominique Seux. The publisher obviously thinks that the latter two are not prominent enough to drive sales.

When dealing with EU topics, member countries’ media tend to focus on national dimensions. Journalists ask whether their government is getting enough from the EU, but not how the most can be made of the EU. The media hardly cultivate an understanding of the common interests all member nations share.

One consequence is that many Europeans do not know how dramatically views diverge from country to country. What seems self-evident in one, is considered ideologically overblown elsewhere. In Germany, for example, there is a broad consensus that budgets must be balanced, so people hardly questioned the Federal Government’s strict approach to Greek debt problems in 2015. In German eyes, there simply was no alternative.

The British press assessed the matter in a rather different way. Commentators in the conservative Telegraph, the leftish Guardian and the liberal Financial Times agreed that further austerity did not make sense, since what Greece needed was debt relief. Without such relief, they argued, the country could not recover.

Eleven months later, Britons decided to leave the EU in a referendum. The votes of traditional Labour supporters, who no longer appreciate the EU the way they did 20 years ago, made the difference. In the past, they saw the EU as a progressive force that protected welfare-state approaches against budget slashing Conservatives. Because of their disenchantment, Brexit is now under way. In Germany, however, hardly anyone knew that Eurosceptics were not only found among Britain’s right-wing hardliners, but in working-class areas as well.

The importance of marking dissent

If policymaking is pooled internationally, public debate must similarly transcend borders. The question is not merely who is right and who is wrong. It also matters to have a joint understanding of what issues deserve debate and which proposals must be taken seriously. Controversial discussions help to clarify disagreements, assess alternatives, facilitate compromise and perhaps even reach consensus.

Such debate typically takes place in parlaments, and media coverage is then guided by the stance of both government and opposition parties. Parliaments systematically generate alternative approaches to whatever the government is doing. Journalists’ work reflects this in-built pluralism.

The media deal with international affairs in a different way. Correspondents basically report what their own government wants to achieve in negotiations – and what it achieves. It helps that the national leaders speak their language and are keen on their attention.

The downside is that the interests that nations share get too little attention. This is so even within the EU, which has pooled policymaking in many areas, and it proves that the European Parliament is still very weak. EU policies are agreed in non-transparent meetings of national cabinet members or even the heads of state and government. Representatives of the national governments have the final say, and their main concern is not policy coherence. They want every participant to be able to return home with something that can be sold as a success. Accordingly,
the European public’s understanding of the EU is extremely fragmented.

Matters are even worse in regard to global institutions like the UN, the World Bank or other multilateral organisations. Two issues matter in particular:

- There is no press freedom in countries under authoritarian rule. Accordingly, there is a lack of serious domestic debate, and most publicly available information is simply government propaganda. A nuanced understanding of complex international issues cannot develop in such circumstances, and public debate has no policymaking.

- Countries are not equal in the media business. One reason is that many former colonies still use the imperial language. In many anglophone countries in Africa and Asia, broadcasters, publishers and news agencies based in London and New York have a huge influence. Domestic media republish their contributions. Paris is similarly influential in francophone countries. Because news of international affairs tends to flow through Europe and North America, however, reporting is often not considered to be impartial.

Global governance approaches are generally assessed according to what they will cost one’s own country. World affairs are thus seen as a zero sum game where one nation’s success comes at the expense of others. The global commons are neglected.

This attitude reflects nation-centred discourse, but it does not fit the global nature of the most important challenges humanity must rise to. Important buzzwords include climate change, war, terrorism, tax evasion, loss of biodiversity, poverty, organised crime and infectious diseases. On its own, no national government can get a grip on these things.

Unfortunately, not even international broadcasters like the BBC, CNN or Al Jazeera are engaging in the necessary kind of cross-border discourse. Their programmes tend to reflect the interests of the countries they are based in. None of them is believed to be really unbiased. Broadcasters like Russia Today, moreover, are directly controlled by their government and known to mix facts and fiction.

Germany’s international broadcaster is not up to the task either, and to a considerable extent, the reason is its outdated mandate. Deutsche Welle’s programme basically spreads German views and news. It would make more sense to host truly international debates and include well-argued foreign standpoints. Such programming would certainly find a larger audience, internationally as well as domestically. However, Deutsche Welle is not supposed to target the German public at all because doing so is the job of regionally-based public broadcasters. This setting is rooted in Germany’s institutional order as it has historically grown, but is does not result in the kind of cross-border discourse that would support policymaking at international levels. To have that kind of impact, Deutsche Welle would have to be geared to serving the German public.

The BBC, which is meant to work for both the British and the international public, is doing more useful work. As its management and editorial staff feel some commitment to the entire Commonwealth, moreover, the BBC is also not quite as ethnocentric as most international broadcasters are. Whether that will stay so in Brexit Britain remains to be seen. The Conservatives, who are currently in power, have long been uncomfortable with the BBC’s independence.

Ultimately, democratic governments must not influence media coverage. Freedom is indispensable. Independent newspapers, broadcasters and new agencies must assume the responsibility for assessing public issues accurately and demanding solutions from the right appropriate levels of policymaking. The understanding that national governments, left to themselves, are unable to solve global problems needs to grow. It won’t hurt if political leaders point that out again and again.
Mutual understanding starts at a small scale, and so does international cooperation. In summer 2016, Germany’s Federal Government and the African Union launched a new exchange programme called the African-German Youth Initiative (AGYI). Martial De-Paul Ikounga, the AU commissioner for human resources, science and technology, explains why youth exchange matters.

Martial De-Paul Ikounga interviewed by Eva-Maria Verfürth

The African-German Youth Initiative (AGYI) will allow young people from Germany to spend time in Africa and for young Africans to do the same in Europe. How will African societies benefit from such exchange?

We have a saying: “Anyone who has travelled has more to tell.” African villages are small, so someone who has never ventured further afield does not have much to talk about. Persons who travel, however, return home with new experiences. They make discoveries and meet new people. African societies appreciate the importance of that, as the saying shows. Young people need to be able to travel. But only those who return can report their experiences. A society gets no input from those who do not come back. That, at any rate, is how African culture sees it.

Are you alluding to Africans who migrate to Europe for good?

Well, when I was young, migration was not the issue it is today. Students would study abroad and return home afterwards. I went to school in Congo and later acquired my degree in engineering in Europe – in France. But I never thought of not returning to my country afterwards. One reason was that my studies were financed by the state. In recent decades, attitudes have changed. Many people leave Africa forever, taking valuable brain and muscle power with them. It is a great loss when people emigrate for good.

Why have attitudes changed?

African governments themselves are partly responsible. They fail to make sure that people have prospects when they return. They will send someone to Europe to train as a baker, for example, but when he comes back he finds no market for his bread. So he goes away again. Yet he could have shown his compatriots what he had learned and thus helped develop skills and expertise within the country. That is a great loss. A government that sends young people abroad to study needs to make sure that they will be able to

African-German Youth Initiative

The African-German Youth Initiative (AGYI) was launched in 2016. The goal is to strengthen civic participation and overcome prejudices among young Germans and Africans. The programme is co-hosted by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and the African Union and coordinated by Engagement Global.

The initiative follows the example of the Franco-German Youth Office. It promotes exchange between young people from Germany and from African countries. It facilitates encounters of individuals as well as groups such as school classes, sports clubs or musical groups. For example, the AGYI cooperates with Deutsche Sportjugend (DSJ), an association representing some 90,000 German sports clubs. In the future, the AGYI could enable African football clubs to meet German counterparts.

The continent-wide approach is innovative. Pilot projects involve Benin, South Africa and Tanzania, but other African countries will soon be added. In the three pilot countries, the AGYI cooperates with three civil-society organisations: the Young Beninese Leaders Association (YBLA), the Wildlife and Environment Society of South Africa (WESSA) and the Tanzania Youth Coalition (TYC).

Currently, some 2,000 young people from African countries and Germany are actively involved in various BMZ-supported exchange programmes and volunteer services. In 2017, an additional 400 are expected.

Eva-Maria Verfürth
make use of the qualifications they have acquired at home.

**What difference will the AGYI make in that respect?**

Above all, it will eliminate barriers. People can educate themselves by reading a lot or going to the cinema. But the learning experience is much more dynamic. I heard a young German say after an exchange: “When I went to Africa, I had lots of preconceived ideas. But not anymore.” And that happens on both sides. Apart from that, young people will learn from the exchange that they need to return and share their experiences.

At the official launch of the AGYI, you said that the initiative would help to promote inner-African exchange. How will it do that?

Well, preconceived ideas exist everywhere, even within our continent – for example about other linguistic groups: anglophones, francophones etcetera. If an exchange can break down our preconceived ideas about Germany, surely it is possible to do the same in regard to close neighbours. This initiative sends out a signal. It says let us live in peace with one another.

In Europe, one country voted against ever-increasing exchange: the Brexit referendum showed that many Britons are worried about migration and want less exposure to other European countries. **Is there evidence of a similar mindset in Africa?**

Yes, there is certainly some evidence of that. Sometimes countries get together to forge alliances but then one of the bigger ones says: no, I am not working with the others. But in truth, we are stronger together – and we generally do cooperate in the end. I am sure the British have no intention of moving their islands elsewhere so they are not part of Europe. No, they want to play in the European soccer championship, against the Germans and the French! They certainly don’t want to play football on their own. So they have to give something back. They will not say they are no longer Europeans.

In the case of Europe, there has already been a great deal of cooperation, yet many people now seem to want more distance. Does rapprochement lead to new walls?

The British cannot undo what European history has accomplished. Think of the great Erasmus Programme. Its trans-European student exchange programme has transformed Europe and is perhaps one of the EU’s greatest achievements. And let me give you another example. From our viewpoint. A young volunteer from South Africa told me about the importance of doing everything on time in Germany. This culture of punctuality marks the way life is structured and friendships are maintained. Having experienced things like this distinguishes those who have studied in other countries. The Erasmus Programme has that kind of impact. Despite all the difficulties there may be between countries, it has created a European mentality. British youth showed that in the Brexit referendum: they voted to remain in Europe. They have become different people – and they think as Europeans.
The Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the EU and three of Africa’s Regional Economic Communities are facing challenges. The EPAs are not only supposed to foster intercontinental trade, but regional integration within Africa too. Critics, however, fear that agreements will hurt regional integration, and ratification has stalled. A new strategic initiative is urgently needed.

By Helmut Asche

The EU isn’t the only regional community experiencing a crisis: Africa’s regional integration has also been much slower than many people expected (see E+Z/D+C e-paper 2016/10, p. 4). The full extent of the problems facing the continent’s regional economic communities (RECs) is unclear, however. We precise data concerning implementation.

Even if a customs union has existed for over a hundred years like the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), it may still not be fully in force. As EU history tells us, non-tariff barriers (NTB) tend to undermine efforts to eliminate customs duties. Only the EU’s bold Single Market Programme of 1987 put an end to the trend.

At present, the East African Community (EAC) is the REC that seems most likely to muster the political will to fully enforce its customs union, relying on mutually agreed standards to reduce non-tariff obstacles. Within the EAC, Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda have formed a coalition to accelerate integration. Their cooperation resembles the EU’s Franco-German axis. Other RECs lack similar coalitions. Most prominently, Nigeria and South Africa, the leading powers in their parts of the continent, are unwilling to drive integration and grant economic leeway to weaker member states.

What is at the root of the problem? Trade theory teaches that the RECs that are most likely to succeed are those that provide less developed members with real trade opportunities through an intra-industrial division of labour. These RECs allow for a regional division of labour within various sectors, including agriculture, manufacturing and mining. The model case is, once again, the EU. Nowhere in Africa is there such an intra-industrial division of labour, and that is why countries have proved unwilling to fully liberalise within the present setting.

One goal of the EU’s policy of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) was to address such problems. Few observers outside the European Commission believe that the EPA negotiations were conceived and conducted the way they should have been. Nonetheless, three regional EPAs are now ready to be signed and ratified:

1. the EAC EPA (with five EAC member states),
2. the ECOWAS EPA (with 15 member states of the Economic Community of West African States plus Mauritania) and
3. the SADC EPA, which really should be called SACU EPA, as it does not comprise all 15 members of the South African Development Community but only the five members of the SACU plus Mozambique.

The agreements focus almost exclusively on liberalising the trade in goods. Their key benefits for African exporters are continued tariff-free access to the EU and improvements to the so-called rules of origin for products entering the European market. In return, African countries will progressively remove trade barriers for about 85% of European exports to Africa. The current state of affairs is as follows:

- The ‘SADC/SACU EPA’ went into effect on 1 October. Another EPA with the other SADC states has been provisionally in effect for years. It is making progress towards ratification. So far, however, the EPA approach has thus split SADC in two.
- The ECOWAS EPA has been signed by 13 African members with the notable exception of Nigeria, which suddenly expressed concerns about negative impacts on its industry. Meanwhile, Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana have ratified individual interim EPAs (iEPAs), thus securing a fallback option for duty-free access to Africa.
- In the EAC, Tanzania has identified negative consequences for its nascent industry and now worries about its trading partner Britain leaving the EU. The government refuses to sign the agreement. Burundi has rejected the EPA in protest of the sanctions imposed by the EU. In response, Rwanda and Kenya made a show of signing the agreement in Brussels; Uganda will likely follow.
In Central Africa, Cameroon has signed a single country interim EPA (iEPA). The government wants to safeguard banana exports to the EU. This iEPA, however, puts an end to the long-planned customs union within the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), unless all other countries make exactly the same market access offer to the EU. There is a draft of a CEMAC EPA, but governments are showing little enthusiasm to sign.

**Feared fragmentation**

Many critics from civil society have long warned that the EPAs will cause renewed fragmentation in Africa. On the other hand, the EAC, ECOWAS and SACU are functioning RECs, and signing agreements with the EU would actually consolidate their common external tariff. In that respect, the European Commission is right to argue that the EPAs promote regional integration in Africa. Since the EPAs are basically trade-in-goods agreements without controversial provisions for services or investments, one can support signing them because they serve the greater good of strong regional communities, as I have argued earlier (Asche 2015).

The concerns that West and East African governments are raising now in regard to the final EPAs have some merit, however. For example, the clauses concerning the protection of new industries or the promotion of domestic commodity processing in Africa are not optimal. The EAC EPA does not even have an infant industry protection clause. Nonetheless, a smart application of the EPA provisions would still allow governments to promote agriculture and manufacturing in targeted ways.
Today, the scenario has changed however. If the EAC and ECOWAS EPAs are not signed, separate agreements will formally apply to individual member states, so the fragmentation that observers feared will indeed occur. With different rules and tariffs for member countries’ EU trade, it will become technically impossible to have African customs unions with common external tariffs, and no REC can even dream of eliminating its internal trade controls completely. Moreover, African leaders have a point in fearing that the RECs will be weakened when negotiating further trade agreements with China, India, Turkey and other emerging economies.

While the more advanced REC members are now concluding their own iEPAs, the least developed countries (LDCs) have the default option of continuing to export goods to the EU free of tariffs under the Everything but Arms initiative (EBA). That does not offer much consolation, however. EBA is a bilateral concession by the EU, not an international treaty. Moreover, several African nations are expected to attain middle-income status soon, so EBA will no longer be a valid backup for them.

One’s approach to trade theory has a bearing on the assessment of the impacts. According to the Anglo-Saxon line of thinking, which is largely shared by World Bank experts, multilateral liberalisation is what matters and regional integration broadly following to the EU model does not stand much of a chance in Africa. From this point of view, the situation does not look particularly dramatic and African RECs are ultimately expendable. To anyone with a different theoretical background, the situation is very worrying. After all, African RECs may well be necessary stepping stones to further multilateral trade integration. A new strategic approach is needed.

**Withdrawal or renegotiation**

Regarding the EPAs, the situation between the EU and African RECs is now very tense. Several policy responses are possible:

- The agreements could be completely withdrawn, which is what most international NGOs are calling for. After the de facto failure of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), such a radical change of course seems entirely possible.
- The agreements could be renegotiated right away. They could also be signed and ratified with the binding stipulation that the text of the agreements will be improved during implementation. This option has the advantage of solidifying the status of EAC, ECOWAS and SACU+ as RECs, scrapping the special iEPA agreements and allowing the accompanying development programmes to be implemented immediately. Simply insisting that the current texts of the agreements remain unchanged is not a promising strategy, however.
- A very good proposal made by the Dutch government, moreover, is that the EU and USA should harmonise their preferential trade agreements with Africa and make a joint offer to further simplify the rules and measures of origin (see Herfkens 2016 for explanation). Such a confidence-building initiative might also be taken up by the G20. Given US President-elect Donald Trump’s anti-trade rhetoric, however, this approach now looks less likely, all the more as the Dutch meant it as a development-friendly TTIP amendment.

Regardless of which negotiating option is chosen, a familiar problem lies at the heart of the EPA disaster: since the 1950s, European powers have seen Africa simply as a supplier of commodities and agricultural products. There was no manufacturing sector to talk of in Africa north of the Limpopo, and European gov-

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**Africa-wide free trade agreement?**

At first glance, there seem to be great alternatives. They are called TFTA (Trilateral Free Trade Agreement between COMESA, EAC and SADC) and CFTA (Continental Free Trade Agreement of the AU). Their appeal is based on the fact that they could undo the hopeless tangle of overlapping regional communities – the “spaghetti bowl” (see D+C/E+Z e-Paper 2016/09, p. 12 and D+C/E+Z print edition 2016/9-10, p. 26) – and create one single market on the continent.

Most observers, however, have become sceptical for various reasons:

- How is liberalisation supposed to succeed between RECs if it doesn’t work within the RECs themselves? The approach would make sense if the only reason for the lack of integration was due to the overlaps between the first-level RECs. It is not.
- There is a risk that the TFTA from Cairo to the Cape would, under current conditions of trade costs, lead to an even higher concentration of industrial activity on the northern and southern edges, in South Africa and Egypt.
- South Africa in turn is reluctant because it fears trade deflection: the TFTA is likely to turn African third-party states into gateways for duty-free imports from China and India – quite a concern in a low-threshold free trade area.

Accordingly, most African governments have become unwilling to seriously negotiate further tariff reductions on goods in the TFTA/CFTA context. TFTA or CFTA are unlikely to become a full-fledged alternative to the established RECs. Both projects have great long-term potential to facilitate continent-wide removal of technical barriers to trade, to ease personal freedom of movement and support cross-regional infrastructure, but that’s the most that can be hoped for. In the meantime, African governments should take the bold initiative to complete integration within the RECs, so no lorry is held up at border posts anymore.
ernments showed no interest in fostering new industries in Africa. This dubious attitude is still evident in the EPAs, although scholarly research has of late stressed the structural need for industrialisation in Africa as a developmental imperative.

Europe’s agriculture and fishery policies have compounded the problems by undermining Africa’s role even as primary producer. Nobody involved in EPA talks on the African side was naive enough to be fooled by the EU’s stated intent to abolish direct agricultural export subsidies, since the so-called decoupled subsidies it uses instead largely have the same effect.

The right solution to this dilemma would be for Germany and its neighbours to take on their next great political project: phasing out present-day industrial livestock farming and highly-subsidised agriculture. This reform is no longer completely unrealistic. Nevertheless, it can only be included in the EPA renegotiations as a project for the future because it would create enormous tension at the social and geographic periphery of the EU in the current moment of crisis.

The upside is that the EU has already achieved significant reforms in certain agricultural regimes. For instance, the most comprehensive reform ever undertaken of the sugar market will go into effect in 2017. It makes sense in spite of possibly harming some small-scale producers both in Europe and in LDCs. Reforming the cotton market, the dairy market or the fisheries agreements would also make sense. Not to offer anything of this kind in future EPA negotiations with Africa would amount to a refusal to strategise.

The EU needs to become strategically a lot more flexible as it now wants to convince African countries of extending the EPAs into other controversial policy areas. Trade in services and technical trade facilitation are at the top of the agenda, and the theoretical case for this approach is clear. It remains a mystery, however, how the EU hopes to persuade Africa’s political leaders to start serious negotiations on these topics following their experience with the EPAs so far. Confidence-building is certainly needed.

The future of the entire economic relationship between Europe and Africa is at stake now. So far, it was regulated by the Cotonou Agreement, which will expire in 2020 and also relates to Caribbean and Pacific countries. The European Commission’s consultations with the policymakers from the respective regions have been half-hearted and uninspiring to date. The EU’s new member governments are not enthusiastic, either. The reason is clear: the Cotonou Agreement never became a platform for discussing joint prospects and bold developmental initiatives. It simply worked as a legal framework for development aid from Brussels and for the EPAs.

Ultimately it seems that a strategic initiative at the AU/EU level under the auspices of high-ranking, mutually respected personalities is urgently needed. This initiative should reassess the future of cooperation between Africa and Europe, with the understanding that the EU needs to re-examine the foundations of its own community, just like the AU needs to reconsider the role of the RECs.

References


Helmut Asche is an economist with 25 years of experience in development cooperation with Africa. Over the last years he taught as professor at the universities of Leipzig and Mainz. This essay is based on a short paper he wrote for Horst Köhler, Germany’s former federal president who had previously served as managing director of the International Monetary Fund.

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A STEP in the right direction

The fragile health systems of most of the developing countries struggle to deliver vaccines wherever they are needed. The East African Community (EAC) is trying to improve matters. With support from a wide range of partners, including Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, the EAC has set up a centre of excellence to enhance expertise in health management.

By Alan Brooks

Supply chains in African countries are often inefficient or not well managed. Managing the supply chain for immunisation is a huge challenge since vaccines are temperature-sensitive and need to be kept cold during their long journey from production to use. Vaccines must not be exposed to damaging temperatures or expire before reaching their destination. Otherwise, clinics may run out of vaccines and thus miss opportunities to vaccinate children against life threatening diseases like pneumonia, meningitis and diarrhoea.

The six member states of the EAC – Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and, since 2016, South Sudan – share a joint vision for attaining “healthy and productive” populations. Well-functioning and strong health systems are essential to make this vision come true, and the professional management of health goods, including the uninterrupted supply of medical products, is a core pillar.

The ever-growing availability of vaccines, medicines and other health products is positive news. At the same time, it stretches health commodity supply chains, not least in low-income countries. Advances in technology, communication and infrastructure help to modernise supply chains, but there are too few supply chain managers with the necessary skills and knowledge. Their competence, however, is the bedrock of improvement.

Innovative training programme

A training course at the EAC’s new Centre of Excellence in Kigali is designed to make a difference. It is called STEP (Strategic Training Executive Programme) and combines academic learning with on-the-job training. STEP helps participants develop problem-solving skills and build teams. It is based on a systematic assessment of the professional competencies needed to manage supply chains.

STEP students are paired up with mentors from the private sector. It is important to put new skills into practice and build knowledge-sharing networks. Therefore, STEP ensures that students are exposed to practical experience for months on end, rather than only relying on classroom teaching.

Lucy Kanja was one of the participants in the first STEP course. She is the manager of a vaccine depot at Dagoretti in Nairobi, Kenya. She says the programme met her professional needs. In particular, she appreciates the idea of taking leadership methods from commercial logistics companies and adapting them to immunisation supply chains.

“At Dagoretti, we have a high turnover of workers, and I used to wonder how we could keep everything going,” she says. STEP taught her how to build teams, attract and retain top talent. “Today, I am mentoring three health workers. I teach them supply chain skills that help ensure effective vaccine management,” she reports.

Staff of Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, interviewed her and other STEP participants for evaluation purposes. Joshua Obel, an operations director at the Kenya Medical Supplies Authority (KEMSA), considers the training course a “STEP in the right direction”. He says: “I have been to a lot of trainings during my career, and this is the only one that I will really be able to put into practice.”

By the end of 2016, 60 professionals from all supply chain levels in various East and West African countries will have graduated from the STEP programme. By 2020, the number should rise to up to 600 supply chain professionals contributing to the health of their communities.
Centre of excellence

STEP is run by the Regional Centre of Excellence for Vaccines, Immunisation and Health Supply Chain Management. The EAC established it in October 2015. It is based at the University of Rwanda in Kigali, but relies on the entire region’s universities to foster expertise and train a new generation of skilled managers. Ultimately, the goal is to ensure that essential and potentially life-saving health products reach everyone in need, no matter where they live.

The Centre is the fruit of a collaboration between the EAC and a wide range of partners, both public and private. They include the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the UN Population Fund (UNFPA), the World Health Organization (WHO), the German KfW Development Bank and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. Private sector partners include the logistics company United Parcel Service (UPS) and the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Wholesalers (IFPW). UPS is providing logistics know-how and helps the Centre to build on some of the development approaches its senior managers use. The IFPW, which represents more than forty companies, funds scholarships for high-potential students. It is also sharing industry insights on supply chain management and supporting mentorship programmes.

Gavi helped to establish the Centre, enabling it to complete its training strategy and launch its programme. The experience of the LOGIVAC Centre in Benin, which pursues similar goals in West Africa, has proved useful in Kigali moreover. Gavi’s mission is to support the world’s poorest countries to improve immunisation coverage.
About Gavi

Children who fall ill cannot thrive. They may become unable to go to school or even play. Parents will not only be worried about their children’s health, but may have to stop working to care for them. Health is thus inextricably linked with poverty at the most basic level – the family. At the same time, it affects a country’s economy as a whole. As a healthy and productive workforce is needed for a nation to flourish, the introduction of life-saving vaccines can make a lasting difference. Obviously, vaccines must reach the children who need them.

More than 40 years have passed since the World Health Organization (WHO) launched its Expanded Program for Immunization (EPI) with the aim of reducing illness and death from infectious diseases through improved immunisation coverage. In the first decade after the programme began, immunisation rates rose rapidly. However, the 1990s saw access to vaccines stagnating, particularly in developing countries.

In an effort to reverse this trend and further expand immunisation coverage, Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance was created in 2000 (see D+C/E+Z e-Paper 2016/11, p. 27). Gavi is a public-private partnership, involving governments, private-sector partners, as well as UN agencies, philanthropic foundations and civil-society organisations. They all share one goal: to save children’s lives and protect people’s health by increasing equitable use of vaccines in low-income countries.

Most developing countries’ immunisation supply chains were originally designed in the early days of the EPI. Supply chains have not evolved at pace as governments and donors have made significant investments in the past decade to ensure that all people across the world have access to safe and effective vaccines.

By 2020, immunisation programmes will be able to protect people in many of the poorest countries from twice as many pathogens as in the 1980s. Additional vaccines will make that feasible, preventing the spread of highly prevalent diseases, such as pneumonia, diarrhoea, diphtheria, pertussis, hepatitis B, meningitis and cervical cancer.

Over the past 15 years, Gavi support has contributed to the immunisation of close to 580 million children and helped countries prevent more than 8 million future deaths, and the latter figure can rise by up to another 6 million in the next four years. The economic gains will be considerable: During the same time productivity gains and savings from treatment costs, transportation costs and caretaker wages due to disability and death will amount to $ 80 billion to $ 100 billion. This figure compares to $ 130 billion spent on official development assistance by the OECD donors in 2015.

A Gavi donor since 2006, Germany has continuously increased its funding. This support culminated at Gavi’s replenishment conference in Berlin in 2015, when the event’s patron, German Chancellor Angela Merkel pledged € 600 million for Gavi in the years 2016 to 2020.
Cross-border wildlife protection

In Southern Africa, poachers and traffickers in illegal wildlife products avoid prosecution by violating national borders and moving from country to country. Cross-border cooperation of law-enforcement agencies can bring culprits to justice and support sustainable, region-wide wildlife management. Support from local communities is helpful too.

By Moses Chakanga, Flora Müller and Klemens Riha

Southern Africa has a unique network of natural habitats and protected areas. This world region is home to an essential share of global biodiversity and hosts a great variety of wildlife. Game animals, moreover, attract tourists. Numerous animal and plant species have benefited from intensive conservation efforts in the past. For example, the Kavango-Zambezi Transfrontier Conservation Area (KAZA) covers more than 400,000 square kilometres in five countries in Southern Africa and is home to approximately 250,000 African elephants.

In total, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) has designated 18 Transfrontier Conservation Areas (TFCAs). They play a pivotal role in safeguarding some of the continent’s largest remaining wildlife populations. They provide livelihoods to many rural communities in and near the parks.
and foster regional integration. More than 270 million people live in SADC countries, and the majority of them depend on natural resources such as clean water, fuel wood, construction materials and food, including bush meat.

The parks generate income and employment. About every 15th job in sub-Saharan Africa is directly or indirectly linked to tourism. Accordingly, wildlife-related tourism is an important pillar of regional development (see D+C/E+Z e-Paper 2015/04, p. 21). However, it is increasingly being undermined by illegal harvesting and trade of wildlife products. Poaching syndicates that are involved in the illegal trade of ivory, rhino horn and other wildlife resources are playing an especially destructive role.

In 2015, more than 1,300 rhinos and 20,000 elephants were poached in Africa. The SADC region was hit especially hard. KAZA and Tanzania’s famous Serengeti National Park were affected for example. Some countries, including Mozambique and Malawi, moreover, have been identified as important transit countries for illegal wildlife commodities.

The current crisis is being fuelled by a growing demand for wildlife products, predominantly in Asian countries such as China and Vietnam. Within the SADC region, poaching and trafficking are related to weak governance, insufficient law enforcement and corruption. In view of high profit margins, transnational organised crime is increasingly involved. High rates of rural poverty and unemployment ensure there is a constant supply of poachers who are willing to risk their lives.

The rise in cross-border poaching and smuggling has serious implications in the affected countries. Not only is the conservation of some critically endangered species at stake – so are the livelihoods and security of local people in the SADC region.

**One giant LEAP**

In response to the dramatic, border-defying trend, the environment ministers of the SADC member states agreed in 2013 to cooperate on tackling wildlife crime. They requested the SADC Secretariat in Gaborone, Botswana, to draft a five-year regional law enforcement and anti-poaching (LEAP) strategy in cooperation with all member states. In addition, the ministers agreed to establish a regional anti-poaching coordination unit at the Secretariat as well as to produce materials for education and awareness raising.

Accordingly, the SADC Secretariat started a comprehensive participatory process to draft the LEAP strategy with support from GIZ (see box, p. 45), and the Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF). The approach tackles the entire illegal trade chain and emphasises five priorities:

- improving field protection,
- minimising the illegal wildlife trade,
- strengthening and harmonising legislation and judicial procedures,
- enhancing community involvement in natural resource management and
- promoting the sustainable use and trade of natural resources.

In November 2015, the member countries’ ministers of environment and natural resources adopted the LEAP strategy for the years 2016 to 2021. In line with the strategy, the five KAZA member countries – Angola, Botswana, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe – are now taking a joint approach to tangible action. For instance, they are implementing joint anti-poaching operation guidelines and rules for cross-border cooperation. In the past, KAZA TFCA ranger patrols had to stop pursuing poachers once criminals crossed a national border. Valuable time was lost while the rangers informed their colleagues in the neighbouring countries, and the poachers would normally have disappeared by the time they arrived. The new guidelines are designed to facilitate better coordination and allow rangers to follow poachers across borders. Better intelligence sharing is meant to help authorities detect poaching activities, foresee patterns, plan proactive enforcement and warn partner agencies in partner countries in a timely manner. Moreover, it is becoming easier to collect and share evidence in order to prosecute organised crime.

The LEAP strategy, moreover, defines the role and responsibilities of the SADC Secretariat’s new Wildlife Crime Prevention and Coordination Unit (WCPC). Goals include to:

- enforce the law more effectively,
- minimise wildlife crime and illegal trade,
- involve people in nature conservation and development efforts,
- ensure sustainable use and trade of natural resources and
- improve the protection of wildlife in the parks.

The member countries must now implement the strategy. The SADC Secretariat is playing a role of leadership, cooperation, coordination, networking and convening. The implementation plan covers finance and resource mobilisation, capacity development, technology development and transfer, communication, advocacy and awareness. The strategy itself brings consistency and unity of purpose among the member states, which are already implementing parts of the strategy using their own often limited resources. Furthermore, the strategy also serves as a tool for mobilising additional resources towards combating wildlife crime. To this end, all SADC member states are actively encouraged to participate in the process of implementing the LEAP strategy on the regional, national and local level, since only a joint effort, built on cooperation and mutual trust, can reduce the threats of poaching and wildlife smuggling in Southern Africa.
Responding to wildlife crime

Germany contributes an annual € 500 million to the conservation of forests and other ecosystems worldwide. A significant share of the funds is implemented through Germany’s development bank KfW on multi-country conservation areas in sub-Saharan Africa, such as the Kavango-Zambezi Transfrontier Conservation Area (KAZA) or the Greater Limpopo Transfrontier Conservation Area. The idea is to save biodiversity in healthy ecosystems while simultaneously promoting sustainable economic development and safeguarding peace and stability.

Given the new dimensions of wildlife crime, Germany’s Federal Government has also increased its international commitments in this area. On its behalf, GIZ is supporting partner countries in Africa and Asia. The Polifund project, financed by Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and the German Federal Ministry for the Environment (BMUB), pools expertise and resources from government agencies, civil-society initiatives and international organisations. Joint activities are organised along the entire chain of illegal wildlife trade. Measures include:

- the introduction of innovations (technological as well as organisational) in the fight against poaching,
- capacity building for law enforcement officials and
- pilot initiatives to reduce the demand for wildlife commodities, primarily in Asia.

The Polifund and the regional GIZ project Transboundary Use and Protection of Natural Resources in the SADC-Region supported the SADC Secretariat in drafting the law enforcement and anti-poaching strategy (LEAP – see main article). Germany also supports tangible efforts to stem wildlife crime in the SADC region, including reforms to strengthen relevant legislation and judicial procedures in Namibia, Tanzania and Malawi. Capacity building for cross-border law enforcement in KAZA is on the agenda as well. Other assisted activities include the improvement of field protection and the monitoring of large conservation areas in Zambia and Tanzania.
Comment

Take on hate crime

Germany’s Federal Government should heed the advice spelled out in a recent report on hate crimes. It was wise to assign the study, and showing unwavering support for human rights means to set the right example.

By Hugh Williamson

German authorities should step up efforts to tackle rising hate crime, according to the German Institute for Human Rights, a government-sponsored think tank. There were 10,373 hate crimes in Germany in 2015, according to the institute’s data, a leap of 77% from 2014.

The institute recently published a report on the matter. The document is important not only for its findings but for its genesis. It was commissioned and paid for by Germany’s Federal Government as part of its role as this year’s chair of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The report assesses Germany’s performance in meeting a range of human-rights standards that apply to all the OSCE’s 57 members.

Unlike the United Nations, the OSCE has no mechanism for monitoring human rights in its member countries, which include European nations, the USA, Canada and countries of the former Soviet Union. This is a major problem in a region where serious human-rights violations and restrictions on basic freedoms are common. For this reason, Germany’s decision to commission this study – a voluntary monitoring of its own human-rights performance – is most welcome.

The German Institute for Human Rights decided on the report’s focus. Both government agencies and civil-society organisations made submissions.

The report defines hate crimes as being “motivated by group-based bias.” It criticises the police and judiciary for their handling of the investigations into at least 10 murders between 2000 and 2007 by the neo-Nazi terrorists of the National Socialist Underground (NSU). It states there are clear “deficiencies” in the way hate-crime legislation is applied, especially in regard to the victims of those crimes. Germany needs to better train police and the judiciary on protecting victims, the report demands. It also calls for more comprehensive data concerning the alleged perpetrators of hate crimes, including on the numbers of cases prosecuted and rulings passed. State agencies should also do more to involve civil society in combating hate crimes, the report says. Finally, it wants Germany to take extra steps to tackle sexual violence and domestic violence and to prevent human trafficking, especially of children.

Germany is the third OSCE chair to commission a self-evaluation of this kind. Switzerland led the way in 2014 followed by Serbia in 2015. Switzerland says its report has led to government steps to improve human rights, for instance by better training Swiss diplomats on human trafficking.

Germany’s self-evaluation is an important signal to other OSCE members that the organisation’s human-rights standards are a vital part of its approach to protecting security in the region. It is now up to Germany to take the next step and act on the report’s recommendations, putting into practice this human-rights commitment.

It is important that Germany set a good example. Respect for human rights has suffered from the divisive rhetoric of US President-elect Donald Trump during the US election campaign. Kenneth Roth, executive director at Human Rights Watch, has said: “He found a path to the White House through a campaign marked by misogyny, racism and xenophobia, but that’s not a route to successful governance. President-elect Trump should commit to leading the US in a manner that fully respects and promotes human rights for everyone.” In this worrisome context, it is important that European governments stay unwaveringly committed to upholding human rights.

Link


Hugh Williamson

is the director of the Europe and Central Asia division of Human Rights Watch. Human Rights Watch was one of the civil-society organisations that made submissions to the German Institute for Human Rights for the report mentioned in this comment.

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Debate

Family members of Enver Şimşek met this year at the place in Nuremberg where NSU terrorists murdered him in 2000.
Slipping apart

Turkey is increasingly keeping a distance towards the European Union, so the EU must reconsider the relationship.

By Nassir Djafari

Turkey has been aspiring to become a member of the European Union for over half a century. Accession talks started in 2005 after Turkey had implemented impressive domestic reforms. The momentum was lost fast, however, because Turkey became a leading emerging market, and national self-confidence grew accordingly.

Turkey’s assessment of Europe became more sceptical. Today, the big role model is hounded by its own crises. Turkey considers itself to be a regional power of global relevance. The west is no longer its only partner.

Syria’s civil war has changed Turkey’s outlook even more. Three issues matter: state failure in the Middle East, Islamist terrorism and the mass flight of war victims to Europe. All three issues have a bearing on Europe’s security and cohesion.

The wars in Iraq and Syria have worsened old ethnic and religious divides, and they have created new ones. Kurdish forces are evidently the most effective opponents of the terror militia ISIS, and they are taking advantage of the current setting to achieve the autonomy they have been wanting for centuries. The stance of Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan towards the increasingly assertive Kurdish community has therefore become confrontational again, even though he himself had started peace talks with the Kurdish militia PKK in 2012.

Moreover, Turkey intervened in Syria in order to block the advances made by the YPG, the militia of Syrian Kurds. Erdogan’s government did not even shy away from cooperating with ISIS in this context. Today, Turkey is at war with the Kurds, both at home and in the neighbouring country. Ankara’s interventions in Syria and Iraq are geared to making sure that Turkey has a say in the Middle East’s future order. Teaming up with Russia serves this purpose too.

In this context, the country has become more strategically important because of the refugee flow to Europe. The deal Turkey struck with the EU means that Ankara now holds the keys to protecting Europe’s external borders. The EU has indicated it will lift visa requirements in return, provided that Turkey reforms its anti-terrorism laws amongst others. This, however, is unlikely to happen, given that Turkey is being rocked by several violent conflicts.

The war with the PKK has been reignited. At the same time, Islamist bombs are exploding because, put under international pressure, Turkey suspended its support for ISIS. Erdogan’s rule has been becoming more authoritarian for years, and since the coup attempt in July, he has become more overtly repressive and is tightening his grip on all state institutions. Turkey itself has become a crisis country.

Turkish-European relations have always been uneasy, and the sense of alienation is now growing. Nobody says so, but none of the parties involved still believes in Turkey becoming an EU member. There are ever more recriminations. While European leaders use diplomatic language fearing that the refugee deal may fail, Erdogan is allowing things to escalate.

The big question at the end of November was which side would first declare the accession talks to have failed. For several reasons, such a declaration is risky for Europe: migration would increase after the collapse of the refugee deal, and Turkey would become closer aligned to Russia. Finding solutions for Syria would become even more difficult.

Turkey has a lot to lose too. The EU is by far its most important partner in trade. The years of strong growth are over. Investors are shying away from Turkey because of security concerns, and tourists are opting for safer destinations.

Erdogan would like the EU to declare the end of the accession talks. It would allow him to blame Europe. The EU must not do him this favour, but it must prepare for the failure of the refugee deal.

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Close to blowing up

Africa’s Great Lakes region is not finding peace. Burundi has been destabilised in many respects, and a similar development looks likely in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). European and African leaders must act fast to prevent turmoil.

By Gesine Ames

In violation of Burundi’s constitution, President Pierre Nkurunziza has held on to power and plunged his small country into a serious political crisis. About 1,000 dead have been counted since April 2015. More than 8,000 have been detained for political reasons, some 800 persons are missing, hundreds have suffered torture and sexualised violence, whilst thousands have been arrested arbitrarily. More than 310,000 people have fled the country.

Now tensions are growing in Burundi’s huge neighbouring country, the DRC (see comment by J. Bashi in D+C/E+Z e-Paper 2016/11, p. 40). As happened in Burundi, the sitting president, Joseph Kabila, seems prepared to cling to power, no matter how much turmoil that may cause. Presidential and parliamentary elections were scheduled for 27 November, but they have been postponed, and no new date was set. The majority of the people and the opposition want Kabila to state clearly that he will not seek an unconstitutional third term.

Kabila’s second term ends on 19 December according to the constitution of the DRC. So far, he has not revealed his intentions. Making matters worse, he is slowing down relevant procedures without offering any clear timelines. For months, he has been open to all sorts of dialogue, but the most important opposition leaders were never involved, so their demands were not heard.

Once again, the people must bear the brunt of a political power struggle. The young generation is affected in particular. They have never known anything but strife and instability. Security is becoming increasingly precarious, especially in the DRC’s eastern provinces. Extreme violence marked massacres near the town of Beni in the summer, and ethnic conflicts are escalating. About 70 different militias operate in the country, and there are worrying signs of former rebel groups being mobilised once again. Civil liberties — including the freedoms of assembly, expression and the press — have been seriously restricted ahead of the elections. Economic development is grinding to halt, and people’s daily hardships are getting worse.

Europe must act

If German and European policymakers want to prevent the kind of scenario the world has witnessed in Burundi, they need to take a common and coherent stance towards the government of the DRC. They must prioritise this issue. Political pressure has to be put on those who are in charge in Kinshasa. Targeted sanctions, including the denial of visa and freezing of bank accounts and financial services, should fast hit those high-ranking officers in the government and security forces who bear responsibility for violent repression and human-rights violations. Culprits’ family members should be targeted in the same way.

At the same time, the African Union and regional organisations such as the International Conference for the Great Lakes Region must assume responsibility and serve as mediators between the government and the opposition. It is important that African partners tell the government of the DRC to respect the constitution. An escalation of violence would have a devastating impact on the entire region and ruin diplomatic relations.

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Violent protests erupted in Kinshasa because of the election postponement.
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