How China is expanding its media influence in Africa

If you look at the social media posts of journalists or influencers in Kenya these days, you’re likely to come across a photo of a journalist hiking on the Great Wall of China or a video of an influencer dancing in the streets of a Chinese city. This is due in part to the efforts of the Chinese Embassy in Nairobi to invite influencers and journalists to China, but also to the growing popularity of Chinese social media apps in Kenya.

TikTok is the second most popular social media platform (after Facebook) in Kenya and the third-largest source of total internet traffic after Google and Facebook, according to a 2025 report by the US technology company Cloudflare. Even amongst messaging apps, the Chinese platforms QQ and WeChat rank second and third, trailing only WhatsApp.

China is a new player in a region where the colonial legacy of Western countries remains a strong presence – and this at a time when geopolitical competition between the world’s major powers over Africa’s growth potential and its vast mineral resources is in full swing, says Admire Mare, head of the Department of Communication and Media Studies at the University of Johannesburg in South Africa. 

According to Mare, China’s investments in African media serve the political and economic agenda of the Asian giant. “It’s about making it easier for them to get their foot in the door,” says Mare. “If you look at all the media investments China has made in Africa, the aim is to promote positive media coverage for China.”

Emeka Umejei, a research fellow at the University of Johannesburg’s Institute of Communication and Media Studies and author of the book “China in African media”, is currently a visiting scholar at Academia Sinica in Taiwan. In his view, China appears to have subtly shifted from state-directed media expansion to a more embedded form of influence, based on partnerships with local media and engagement with journalists and influencers.

Traditional and social media

China had previously established media organisations in Africa, including radio (China Radio International), television (China Global Television Network, CGTN), print media (China Daily) and digital media (websites and social media pages). In addition, the Chinese news agency Xinhua maintains 37 correspondent offices in Africa. These organisations have active partnerships and agreements for content sharing with African media organisations. 

However, China no longer relies only on its media companies to win over the hearts and minds of people in Africa, explains Umejei. “It uses a variety of channels. The most effective of these are the China-funded journalist exchange programmes, media partnerships and content-sharing agreements,” he says. 

It therefore appears that China is currently pursuing a two-pronged strategy, using traditional media to boost its credibility while at the same time relying on social media to win over young audiences.

In Kenya, Chinese news organisations have entered into agreements with media institutions such as the Kenya News Agency, the Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (the state broadcaster) and the Media Council of Kenya. These agreements cover areas such as training, equipment, scholarships and exchange programmes.

At the same time, the authors of a report published by Africa Check, an organisation dedicated to information resilience, fact-checking and media literacy, noted a rise in “influencer diplomacy”. This refers to the use of influencers with a wide reach to spread China’s narrative. “The risk for public opinion lies in the formation of an emotional, largely uncritical affinity particularly among younger Kenyan audiences towards Chinese interests. By prioritising aesthetics and personal storytelling, influencer content can displace policy-focused debate with superficial lifestyle narratives, potentially increasing receptiveness to external influence,” state the authors.

Investments in communication infrastructure 

China is also investing in African media companies and communications infrastructure, for example through a controversial project launched in 2016: when Zambia ran into difficulties with the rollout of digital broadcasters, the powerful media group StarTimes – which has close ties to the Chinese government – stepped in to help by setting up a joint venture, in which it holds a 60 % stake.

StarTimes has also played a key role in Kenya’s transition to digital television, and figures from March by the state-run Communication Authority show that it controls 44 % of the Kenyan digital television market. 

Another example is Chinese technology giant Huawei: it continues to work with the Kenyan company Safaricom, East Africa’s largest telecommunications provider, on rolling out 5G networks and infrastructure for mobile payment services.

Trips to China as soft power

China’s “soft power” lies in the fact that some influencers and journalists in Africa – whose media organisations can barely afford to pay salaries – feel a sense of obligation towards China when they are invited to visit the country and receive an expense allowance. They are then likely to report in a China-friendly manner in the hope of getting on the local Chinese embassy’s good side and being invited back, according to scholar Umejei.

“Some of them have travelled there and returned with money. They have used the money to build houses or complete ongoing projects. Some bought cars with it,” says Umejei, citing interviews with journalists from several African countries. He adds that some of the beneficiaries of such trips to China “are beginning to champion [China’s] economic and political interests in newsrooms across Africa because they want to return there.”

This raises some serious questions. How can a country that imprisons its own journalists become a magnet for African journalists? On the other hand, many countries court foreign journalists – so what’s wrong with China doing the same?

Toolkit to strengthen China’s influence

Umejei says that China’s aim is not to discourage people in Africa from consuming other media that put forward narratives serving the interests of China’s geopolitical rivals, but to ensure that pro-Chinese messages reach the general public in Africa.

Reports on Chinese platforms focus on mega-projects, tourism and inventions in order to portray China as “developed”. However, the close ties between China and African governments, as well as the scarcity or complete absence of critical reporting on democracy, elections or freedom in the Chinese media, have certainly drawn criticism from African viewers. 

“When it comes to political or economic news, nobody will trust CGTN. But when it comes to tourism, documentaries and adventure programmes, that’s exactly what people will be watching [on CGTN],” says Umejei.

Mare adds that China’s aggressive self-promotion in traditional media, on social media and in the entertainment industry is part of the toolkit used to strengthen China’s influence in Africa. Above all, the aim is to consolidate its economic and political interests – particularly in light of declining media investment from the West.

The West is trailing behind in the African media landscape

Mare notes that Western fears regarding Chinese influence in African media should be viewed against the backdrop of dwindling Western investment in media development in Africa. Scholarships and exchange programmes for journalists in Western capitals have been scaled back dramatically over the last two decades, he argues.

Furthermore, media organisations in the West have cut back on their reporting teams in Africa, meaning that important stories go unreported and causing them to lose their African audiences. Some of the media outlets that used to cover geopolitically relevant issues from Africa are facing political pressure in their home countries; for example, several media companies are currently undergoing legal proceedings in the US.

All these factors have given China a foothold in the continent’s newsrooms. Over the past two decades, an increasing number of African journalists have joined Chinese media organisations, travelled to China and written for Chinese publications.

This trend is hardly surprising for other reasons, too. Western-funded media support agencies have come under criticism for bringing media experts to the continent to give African journalists training in Western-style journalism. “Some of these people don’t even understand the context, and that’s a problem for me, because you can’t just come here and diagnose a problem you know nothing about,” says Mare.

Finally, if an African journalist wishes to travel to the West as part of a scholarship or exchange programme, they must meet strict visa requirements that in some cases include providing details of their income. As journalists on the continent are poorly paid, very few are likely to meet the financial criteria necessary to be granted a visa for the West. Obtaining a visa for China for the funded fellowships, on the other hand, Mare argues, is much easier.

Sources

Umejei, E., 2026: China in African media: between influence operations and decolonization. Bloomsbury Publishing.

Africa Check, 2026: Soft power and hard (newsroom) choices: Mapping Kenya-China media ties and risks to information resilience.

Alphonce Shiundu is a Kenyan journalist, editor and fact checker.  
shiunduonline@gmail.com