Danger of nuclear-weapons

The dangers arising from nuclear weapons after the end of the Cold War were well underestimated. The risk of North Korea and Iran acquiring atomic arms and terrorists coming into possession of nuclear weapons is just the tip of the iceberg, as became apparent at the 16th Forum on Global Issues held by the German Foreign Office in Berlin in March. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 – the basis of the international regime against the spread of nuclear weapons – is increasingly losing its binding force.

According to Harald Müller, director of the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt and former chairman of the UN’s Advisory Board on Disarmament, the behaviour of the recognised nuclear weapons states is promoting the spread of atomic weapons. In his view, they create threats to other countries, make nuclear weapons a status symbol, devalue a ban on them and selectively take action against violations. By contrast, Annalisa Giannella, EU representative for weapons of mass destruction, argues the main reason for reaching for the bomb are regional tensions. In her view, Iran feels threatened by India, Pakistan and Israel. There is general agreement that both the atomic armament of Iran and North Korea must be prevented and the NPT must be stabilised and strengthened.
According to Mark Fitzpatrick from the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, one cannot use military means to prevent Iran from producing weapons-grade uranium because not all the enrichment plants can be destroyed by air raids. Meanwhile, negotiations were seen to be difficult but not hopeless at the conference. Giannella, German Foreign Office officials and Mark Fitzpatrick, who worked in the US State Department until 2005, all agreed on the steps that need to be taken: the USA must support security guarantees for Teheran, which Washington has not been prepared to do so far. The West should advocate for a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East, including Israel, press on with the peace process in the region and acknowledge Iran’s regional role.

Teheran must not be given the impression that the country should be subject to special regulations as a “rogue state” or prevented from using nuclear energy. The Iranian government has so far refused to give up its own uranium enrichment and have nuclear fuel supplied instead, or to make joint use of an enrichment plant abroad. Instead of urging only Iran to take such a step, the community of states should aim for a general internationalisation of fissile material production. All states that adhere to the NPT should be able to have a share in enrichment facilities run by multinational corporations. That would make it difficult to manufacture weapons-grade material in secret.

However, countries like Iran will only be drawn into this if the nuclear weapon countries also fulfil their obligations arising from the Non-Proliferation Treaty with respect to atomic disarmament. There was agreement in Berlin over the necessary short-term steps: the nuclear weapon states should further dismantle their arsenal, ratify the agreement on the complete ban on nuclear testing, stop developing new atomic weapons and registering anti-missile systems and conclude an agreement that ends the production of new weapons-grade material.

All treaty states should clearly condemn violations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The United State’s planned atomic cooperation with India (which, like Pakistan and Israel, does not belong to the NPT and possesses nuclear weapons) was criticised as harmfully favouring a country. The US administration should demand in return that India takes on the obligations of a nuclear weapon state under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, enter into the agreement to stop nuclear testing and not acquire any more nuclear weapons.

Harald Müller stressed that the long-term goal must be to abolish all nuclear weapons. Otherwise it will not be possible to prevent dozens of nuclear weapon states from emerging and increasing the risk of a nuclear war. However, Müller appeared sceptical as to whether an increase in nuclear weapon states can be avoided. On the other hand, Hans Blix, former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), sees a new opportunity for disarmament. In his view, the wars in Iraq and Lebanon have shown that the use of military force has declined and the costs for it have risen. Furthermore, there is no longer any threat of war between superpowers: “Can you imagine a war over the Chinese exchange rate or CO2 emissions?”

William Walker from St. Andrews University recommended preparing new initiatives for the period after the change of the US administration in late 2008. The conference issued a plea that the NPT Review Conference in 2010 must not fail again as in 2005.

Bernd Ludermann