Poor results

In June, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) published figures on cocaine plantations in Colombia indicating reason to hope that the anti-drugs policy called “Plan Colombia” (see box) is proving effective. As a result of stringent enforcement, UNODC found that the space taken up by drug cultivation was cut by more than half since the record year of 2000.

But appearances are misleading. Colombia is still the world’s main cocaine producing country. In fact, Colombia supplied 62 percent of global production in 2006. To judge by data provided by the US administration, moreover, the total plantation space was probably not diminished at all. In the experience of Hector Moncayo, a Colombian economics professor, US statistics are generally more accurate than UN statistics.

In any case, destruction of coca plantations in Colombia have not made a noticeable dent in the global supply of narcotics. From 2000 to 2002, UNODC finds that supply dropped from 925 to 800 tons before rising again. By last year, it had gone up to 984 tons. Apparently, coca fields are becoming more productive. Moreover, cocaine is also being produced in Peru and Bolivia to compensate for production losses in Colombia. UNODC estimates that production dropped by 30 tons in Colombia in 2006, while rising by 34 tons in Peru and Bolivia. Whatever the truth may be, a gram of cocaine cost a mere $ 135 on US streets last year, compared with $ 210 in 2003.
Plan Colombia has, indeed, proven somewhat more successful in the battle against the country’s main leftist guerrilla organisation, the “Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia” (FARC). The military has driven the FARC away from the major cities, the most important overland roads have become safer, and the number of kidnappings has fallen.

The clamp-down on the drugs economy, moreover, has slowed down the flow of funds to the FARC. Today, the risk of drug smuggling has become so great that the guerrillas pay intermediaries to do the job for them. According to the US Congress, cocaine-related FARC profits dropped by around a quarter from 2003 to 2005. But, while the FARC may have been weakened, they have definitely not been destroyed. It is estimated that some 11,000 rebel fighters are still deployed in 30 of Colombia’s 32 provinces. Skirmishes between them and the military are daily occurrences in rural areas, and so are bombings and kidnappings. Jairo Hernando Estrada, a Colombian professor of political science, says that the FARC are consolidating power in hard-to-reach areas, continuing to operate there. He says that the government will not be able to stamp out the FARC anytime soon by military means.

Strong side effects

The current strategy against coca plantations is not only controversial for its poor results, but also for its harsh consequences in terms of health, ecology and social welfare. For instance, people from the areas sprayed with pesticide complain about rashes and eye inflammations. The government reassures everyone that Roundup Ultra, the herbicide it uses, does not harm people or the environment, but civil-society organisations are convinced that it increases the risk of miscarriages and cancer.

Furthermore, the campaign to combat drugs endangers the region’s biological diversity, with pesticide-use being only one of the serious problems. Coca farmers are destroying valuable forests in previously untouched areas in search of new crop land. Making matters worse, the social consequences are devastating. Many coca farmers whose livelihoods were destroyed have migrated to cities, where they live in desperate poverty.

New approach needed – but not in sight

Critics say Plan Colombia must be discontinued. They argue that the battle against drug cultivation can only be won if farmers are enabled to improve their standards of living without resorting to narcotics production. It is estimated that some 70,000 families live off the production of cocaine, without any other income.

Land must be distributed more equitably as part of the reform programme. So far, less than a quarter of Colombia’s arable land is under the plough. Most of the land in use, moreover, is owned by speculators and what are effectively modern-day feudal lords on gigantic farms called “haciendas”. If the government wants to see real progress, it should also step up its investments in rural education, and prosecute intermediate dealers.

The anti-FARC strategy also needs refocusing. But such a change of course is only possible if the US changes its attitude towards Colombia, too. The US should put less emphasis on financial aid, but more pressure on Colombia’s traditional elites. The country’s ruling classes have, so far, shown only little interest in good governance, the rule of law and democracy. All too often, political decision-makers put their own interests before the public good. Elites often resort to cronyism, exploitation and corruption to guard their power. As a result, social services suffer, the judiciary becomes biased, and reforms are postponed indefinitely.
The governments in Bogotá and Washington both seem uninterested in any significant change of course, however. Uribe’s cabinet does not question the strategy of combating the guerrillas and drug cultivation by military means.

Economics professor Moncayo believes he knows the reason. In his view, the concept fits in well with plans for a free trade agreement between Colombia and the US. First of all, foreign investors feel safer since civil war was pushed to the country’s fringes. Second, Colombia’s legal exports focus on crude oil, coal and tropical plants – resources found mainly in southern Colombia, right where cocaine plantations are most common and the guerrillas most active. “Illegal plantations and the FARC give the government a good excuse to display force in these areas,” Moncayo surmises.

At any rate, from 2007 to 2013, President Álvaro Uribe plans to invest nearly $ 44 billion in his “Strategy to strengthen democracy and social development” - also known as “Plan Colombia II”. Uribe presented this strategy early this year. International donors will be footing $ 12.6 billion of the bill, a quarter of which will come from the US alone.

If the Bush administration gets its way, this money – in a continuation of current practice – would mainly be spent on the military. But the Democratic majority in the US Congress sees things differently. Pointing to corruption in Colombia’s armed forces, the poor results of the first phase of Plan Colombia and, more recently, the dealings of around a dozen of high-ranking Colombian politicians with paramilitary groups, Democrats demand that more be spent on social development and the legal system.

Nonetheless, the US will probably stick to the current strategy, which, after all, is defending the US’s economic, military and social influence in the Andes as well as providing US-based firms with access to commodities. It nicely fits Washington’s regional policy. A number of Colombia’s neighbours are on a leftist, independence-minded course. President Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, Rafael Correa in Ecuador and Evo Morales in Bolivia are stressing the national interests of their countries. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, moreover, resources from the Andes cover some 20 % of US energy consumption.